Early Years of the Canada-United States Foreign Intelligence Relationship

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Introduction
Canada and the United States share a close intelligence relationship. While not an equal partnership, it is mutually beneficial, has a long history, and continues today.

Intelligence cooperation, or liaison, is an under-studied phenomenon and is “one of the least sufficiently studied aspects of the entire field.” While for some experts the very notion of inter-nation intelligence cooperation remains almost an oxymoron, most recognize its importance. “Modern intelligence is a multinational activity.... [N]ational intelligence power is a function not only of national capabilities but also of the foreign cooperation and product they obtain.”

Intelligence sharing goes on in secret but the amount shared is considerable. One estimate suggests that Western intelligence agencies share most of what they produce with some albeit not all others. Another suggests roughly half of the material most intelligence agencies provide to their national governments “is not their own.”

International intelligence liaison has increased and become more commonly addressed in the intelligence literature, although there remains a dearth of case studies exploring why states cooperate on intelligence and how it occurs.

The wartime signals intelligence relationship between the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is one of the best known cases of foreign intelligence cooperation. Formalized in the late 1940s as the Five Powers Agreement, it is the essence of the broader intelligence relationship existing today between these five nations. While the postwar formal SIGINT [signals intelligence] agreements are unmatched in depth and extent, formal and informal intelligence exchanges and cooperation beyond the realm of signals intelligence is extensive. These developed independently, becoming more enduring in the postwar years as intelligence organizations were reorganized, restructured, and resourced for peacetime mandates.

This paper follows the development of Canada-United States foreign political intelligence cooperation and exchange structures. No intelligence relationship existed between Canada and the United States before World War II. The ad hoc architecture developed during the War were followed by more permanent structures after the war. By the early 1950s, intelligence cooperation was entrenched with a solid foundation. The paper also explores three cases of Canada-U.S. cooperation in the realm of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection during the period from the 1950s to the 1980s.

The Beginnings
Canada-U.S. intelligence liaison must be viewed in the context of a broader western intelligence alliance which began in World War II and continued into the postwar period. The Canada-United States SIGINT relationship got underway in October 1941 when Canada offered access to Canadian monitoring results. Few details are available on what this comprised, but an exchange of Japanese military traffic was certainly underway between Canada and the U.S. by August 1942.

Links between Canadian intelligence and the OSS [U.S. Office of Strategic Services] were established early in the war but did not initially involve an exchange of intelligence material. The OSS sent officers to Canada in early 1943 to study Canada’s success in exploiting German POW correspondence to prepare socio-economic and political assessments on enemy-controlled areas.
Herbert Norman, of Canada’s Special Intelligence Section, hosted within the Examination Unit, the Canadian SIGINT agency, met with the OSS in Washington in October 1943 to lay out the foundation for an intelligence exchange. This was not an expansion of the SIGINT relationship but an initiative to exchange all-source intelligence assessments.

Norman’s Special Intelligence Section began a liaison relationship with the OSS involving Japanese diplomatic messages covering economic policy and “Japanese efforts at exploitation and organization of conquered territory.” Some French and Spanish material was also made available.

Because the OSS could not provide a satisfactory guarantee of protecting Canadian intelligence material, an OSS official was only allowed to read the reports in the office of Lester B. Pearson at the Canadian Legation in Washington.

Canada received various weekly bulletins and research data from the OSS. Ottawa’s perception of the OSS was not positive. George Glazebrook, a wartime intelligence officer and postwar head of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee, recalled that the OSS was “overwhelmed by size, inexperience and romanticism.” He despairingly described an OSS officer responsible for French matters as “a professor of something who had once had a holiday in France.” A colleague, Thomas Stone, wrote that “not only are O.S.S. intelligence reports on Europe bad but ... they must be read by people that have a tragically insufficient knowledge of their field on which to base any critical study of the reports.”

Notwithstanding the perceived effectiveness of the OSS, the relationship remained in place throughout the war. “Will Bill” Donovan, the head of the OSS, visited Canada, where he met with Canada’s prime minister, Mackenzie King. The event, recorded in King’s diary, was not momentous. “Had a pleasant talk with General Donovan re orientals on the Pacific Coast,” wrote King.

The conclusion of the war changed the dynamics of the intelligence relationship. Downsizing followed before a new threat emerged. The September 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko brought home to Canada a new relationship with the Soviet Union.

At war’s end Canada’s foreign ministry continued its small foreign intelligence organization while exploring options for a postwar intelligence architecture to address peacetime challenges. Canada adopted a British model. In the late 1940s Canada established its own Joint Intelligence Committee (CJIC), Joint Intelligence Bureau (CJIB), and a Joint Intelligence Staff (CJIS).

These new intelligence bodies were not part of the small foreign political intelligence unit at External Affairs, with undisclosed responsibilities. Canada’s JIB was a military intelligence body directed by External Affairs. Similarly, the chairman of the CJIC was also an officer from External Affairs. The rationale for External Affairs leadership was that it was best suited to follow international events and to advise on requirements in support of formulating foreign and defence policies.

Little cooperation with the United States was anticipated beyond the areas of security and military intelligence. While both nations were intent upon continuing the wartime intelligence exchange there was no postwar framework within which this could take place.

The intelligence relationship between External Affairs and the OSS ended in October 1945 when the latter was abolished. The OSS Research and Analysis Branch was transferred to the State Department and no further intelligence exchanges could follow until the State Department had reviewed the relationship. Nothing was heard from the State Department.

In September 1949, James George, an External Affairs officer, met with State Department INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] representatives to propose an exchange relationship. George briefed the group on the service intelligence exchanges between the Canadian and the American armed forces and Canada’s desire to expand exchanges to include conventional political intelligence. INR was sympathetic and suggested that Canada request a copy of an innocuous INR publication, which might provide a catalyst to more enhanced intelligence exchanges. But a full intelligence exchange did not emerge until early 1952.

The relationship between External Affairs and INR did not involve the Canadian CJIC and CJIB. Both were located at National Defence, albeit directed by senior External Affairs intelligence officers. The External Affairs intelligence activities remained clouded by the absence of a governing structure which was only remedied by the creation of the Defence Relations 2 Division (DL2) in 1950, the first acknowledgment of the department’s intelligence function. Previously, intelligence was subsumed within geographic or functional divisions.

The [U.S.] Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947. No immediate intelligence relationship between the CIA and Canadian foreign intelligence was established. An
early step in establishing a political intelligence exchange between External Affairs and the American national intelligence agency was taken in February 1949 when G.G. Crean, the External Affairs-based chairman of the CJIC, and a senior Canadian foreign intelligence officer, met with R.H. Hillenkoetter, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the CIA’s initiative. They agreed to discuss establishing a liaison arrangement between the CIA and the CJIC. While Crean met with Hillenkoetter as chairman of the CJIC, he (Crean) was also director of External Affairs’ DL2 division. He did not include the broader foreign intelligence interests of Canada in the discussions. His reasoning cannot be determined, but Canada was always excessively cautious in foreign intelligence matters which might explain the omission.

Crean and Hillenkoetter discussed placing a CIA liaison officer in Ottawa “in view of the ever-growing close relationships, particularly in defense matters, between Canada and the United States, [and] that the establishment of such a position would be of benefit to both of our organizations.” Crean suggested that a CIA liaison relationship be established with the CJIB and the Director of Scientific Intelligence of the Defence Research Board and Crean held out the possibility of liaison with External Affairs for foreign intelligence, but made no commitment. No liaison resulted at the time.

In June 1950 the CIA sent Col. Robert A. Schow and James Jesus Angleton to Ottawa to discuss a liaison arrangement. The visit was a failure. The CIA was interested in a broad exchange of intelligence material, particularly in counter-intelligence, whereas Canada wanted a focus on economic and scientific intelligence. The Americans also sought Canadian assistance in conducting espionage abroad. Canada was not prepared to embark upon such operations, but would do so within a very few years (as discussed below). While the Canadians and the CIA remained in contact no exchange arrangements followed.

Early in 1951, Lt. Gen. Charles Foulkes, the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, visited Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, the Director of the CIA, to reopen the question of liaison arrangements. Foulkes pointed out to Bedell Smith that no clear link existed between the CIA and Canadian intelligence agencies, which were anxious to review CIA National Intelligence Survey papers. Bedell Smith agreed to provide Canada with Agency studies provided that the material did not circulate beyond National Defence. Bedell Smith also invited a Canadian “intelligence team” to come to Washington to discuss exchanges and requirements with their opposite numbers in the CIA. In April, Ivor Bowen, the new Director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, and J.A. Langley, Director of Scientific Intelligence, went to Washington for discussions with CIA counterparts. As a result, Canada sent CJIC papers to the CIA, excluding any which bore on Canadian policy to third parties (or to the United States). The CJIC-CIA relationship blossomed but did not involve DL2, the foreign intelligence unit at External Affairs, notwithstanding that the CJIC.

Canada remained exceptionally cautious in the field of intelligence. A decision was taken in 1951 not to establish a distinct secret foreign intelligence collection service. This placed limits on what foreign intelligence was available to Canada, both for its own use and as material to exchange with allies. By 1952 the CIA was complaining that the Canadian contribution to the bilateral relationship was inadequate, and that Canada was “the poorest contributor of all those collaborating with the CIA.” The CIA was correct in that Canada had little covertly collected intelligence to exchange.

In response to CIA prodding, Canada established an “Interview Program” in 1953, within the CJIB, to debrief defectors from Eastern Europe as well as travelers who had observed or gained access to areas or subjects of intelligence interest. The CIA had urged the Canadians to pursue this for some time. In June 1952, Foulkes had informed Bedell Smith and his “Chief of Interrogation” about the Canadian initiative. While input and advice from the CIA on subjects to be interviewed would be solicited, CIA staff would not be permitted to participate in debriefings.

The Interview Program was not a covert collection program. The intelligence sources did not normally remain in place to provide a stream of intelligence but could only contribute a snapshot reflecting a distinct point in time. The information, however, contributed to intelligence puzzles.

For much of the early years the Canadian relationship with the CIA was conducted by Lt. Gen. Foulkes as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, although the operational relationship remained with the CJIB, a civilian unit which remained located with National Defence until 1968. The CIA, however, remained interested in developing a relationship with intelligence at External Affairs.

A Canada-U.S. political intelligence relationship began to blossom after Allen Dulles became head of the CIA. George Glazebrook, Director of Defence Liaison 2 (DL2 – the Canadian
foreign intelligence unit), visited Washington in 1953 to discuss direct links between them. Earlier talks that had come to nothing, in part because DL2 thought the CIA did “practically everything that a professional wouldn’t do.”37 By the early 1950s Canadian perceptions had moderated. Glazebrook concluded an exchange agreement with the CIA, and a CIA liaison officer was stationed in Ottawa.38 Because of operational concerns expressed by Glazebrook, he was invited by Dulles to draft the letter of instruction for the CIA liaison officer.39

By the early 1950s, the pattern of Canada-U.S. sharing of political intelligence was established and would expand as circumstances and resources permitted. The relationship had come about without a strategic plan, a vision, or defined objectives by either side. This disproportionate relationship did develop and has endured for more than a half century. The intelligence relationship between the CIA and the successive foreign intelligence sections of the Department of External Affairs -- Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Development has been longstanding and mutually beneficial.40

The nonchalant, even chaotic, manner in which the relationship with the CIA developed is hard to explain. The more proactive process of establishing ties between the Department and INR in the U.S. State Department was easier, and reflected normal links between two foreign ministries with a track record of cooperation.

The security and military intelligence relationships evolved as a progression of what had existed during World War II. Not so for foreign intelligence, where hesitancy governed both sides. Little thought was given to expand the links between National Defence intelligence units and the CIA to encompass the foreign intelligence organization at External Affairs. The caution with which Canada’s foreign ministry established ties with the CIA reflected the approach Ottawa and the Department took in all aspects of Canadian intelligence. The result, however, reflected the fact that External Affairs was the CIA’s logical Canadian counterpart with respect to collecting and assessing intelligence. We pursue this point below.

**External Affairs’ Covert HUMINT Operations**

Canadian diplomats in the Cold War era ventured beyond mere diplomatic reporting to engage in covert as well as overt intelligence collection.

Canadian international HUMINT operations grew from External Affairs’ responsibility for managing international intelligence liaison. They also arose when opportunity met alliance needs. From time to time, foreign service officers found themselves in locations where Canada’s allies had limited access or no presence at all.41 The Canadians could gather on-the-spot intelligence that their allies could not. A further required factor was that Canada’s allies desired that intelligence. When these two conditions intertwined, the government of Canada tasked its diplomats to step into the breach.

Motivation for this significant shift in tasking is Ottawa’s perception that Canada should “pay its dues” to its intelligence partners.42 Collection tasks fell to Canadian missions abroad because “they are there” and because Canada “owed” its allies. These tasks were carried out by foreign service officers rather than trained intelligence operatives due to Canada’s lack of a HUMINT agency.

Three covert or quasi-covert External Affairs HUMINT operations over the postwar period have been identified. All three reflect the underlying factors of opportunity and need. Department officers conducted two long term intelligence programs, in Indochina, during the 1950s and 1960s, in Cuba, during the 1960s and early 1970s, and a short-term effort, in Tehran, during 1979-80. Somewhat sketchy accounts exist in the extant literature of the first and last of these. These three are almost certainly not the only such operations mounted by the Department; we believe they are the operations that have so far come to light.

**Case 1: Indochina 1950s and 1960s**

In 1954 Canada accepted a position on the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Indochina, a role in Lester Pearson’s words as “onerous as it certainly was unsought.”43 Canada became one of three Commission members, along with Poland and India, whose mission was to maintain tenuous cease fires, to supervise the disengagement of military forces, particularly those of colonial France, and to establish territorial zones for the other combatants.44 ICSC work necessitated a commitment of diplomatic and military personnel to a region where Canada had few personnel and no defined interests. While Canada’s role was one of the first postwar cases where the country assumed its newfound internationalist obligations, it became much more than that.

While “unsought,” the ICSC role was not one Canada struggled to avoid. Having been asked and being inclined to accept, External Affairs sought the support of its most important ally. The United States refused to be a signatory to the Geneva accords that ended the French colonialism in Indochina and created the ICSC. But, as Ottawa knew, the United States had
growing concerns about the conflicts. As Ottawa appreciated, parts of Indochina were closed to outsiders, and the Americans had few reliable sources of information on the area. Canada’s truce supervision work would provide its diplomats and soldiers with access to key and often contested areas where other Westerners could not go, and to key personalities on both sides.”

Two days after the conclusion of the July 1954 conference that led to Canada’s nomination as one of the ICSC commissioners, the Canadian ambassador in Washington, Arnold Heeney, met with State Department representatives. If Canada were to take on the ICSC job, he said, it would be in a position to share resultant intelligence with the American government. Heeney was undoubtedly acting on the direct instructions of Lester Pearson, the External Affairs minister. Washington accepted the offer, noting the arrangement could be mutually advantageous. Thus assured, Canada began its new international commission role and western intelligence job. The Canadians liaised with the State Department and worked particularly closely with the CIA. When Canada was considering its future on the Commission in 1956, the key discussion the ambassador in Washington had was with Allen Dulles, director of the Agency. Dulles assured Ottawa that it was useful for Canada to stay on the commission.

As James Eayrs showed in his 1983 history of the Indochina mission, Canadian representatives used the ICSC as cover to collect military and political intelligence. The information came from the three Canadian commissioners, from their staff, and from the ICSC observer teams sent out into the field. External Affairs shared that intelligence with the U.S. and its other UKUSA alliance partners, Britain and Australia. The flow to London was continuous with reports to the Foreign Office provided roughly once a week. “This is the sort of … information,” noted John Holmes, “which we are in a unique position to give to our friends.” As the assistant under-secretary of state for External Affairs at the time, Holmes was effectively in charge of the operation.

Much of the material comprised regular reports from the Canadian commissioners, for example, on the state of play within the ICSC and on meetings with key government personnel in Laos, Cambodia and divided Viet Nam. When the Commission was based in Hanoi the Canadians met with a range of government officials and were often dined with the defence minister, General Vo Nguyen Giap. They sent back to Ottawa full accounts of these occasions. Such appreciations of key North Vietnamese personalities sometimes related their determination to reunite their country – a view not likely received well in Washington.

Canada’s activities, however, went beyond routine sharing with its allies of standard diplomatic reporting. Its intelligence work also included actively responding to American requests for “tasked collection.” One book-length treatment of Canada’s ICSC experience, by Douglas Ross, does not dispute that External Affairs diplomats, along with Canadian military officers, conducted extensive intelligence operations. In his book, however, Ross refers only once to these operations, and then very briefly and in passing. At somewhat greater length, he downplays their significance. He argues essentially that intelligence collection and sharing with allies was a recognized part of ICSC members’ jobs.

Neither External Affairs nor the government ever claimed that intelligence was part of the job; indeed, it sought to keep the intelligence operations as secret as possible. Eayrs notes that as early as 1967 a Canadian newspaper, the Montreal Star, and the CBC revealed the ICSC intelligence operations. The CBC reported the fact that the Canadian mission in Viet Nam was routinely sharing its outgoing despatches with the U.S. embassy in Saigon, and doing so before transmitting them to Ottawa. The associate editor of the Star bristled; the Canadians “are functioning as spies when they are supposed to be serving as international civil servants.” One contemporary analyst recently characterized Canadian ICSC personnel as “diplomatic couriers” for Washington during this period. Their activities in fact went far beyond the role of couriers. The Canadians were intelligence hunter-gatherers and providers.

Case 2: Cuba, 1960s-1970s

External Affairs diplomats conducted overt and covert intelligence collection in Cuba after Fidel Castro gained power in 1959. Washington sought Canadian and British help following the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Castro government, and closure of the American embassy, in early 1961. Canadian intelligence operations in Cuba continued through the decade, ceasing in the early 1970s.

Initially, the Canadian embassy in Havana provided mostly open-source information, such as copies of Cuban government publications. Soon Ottawa was sending the ambassador’s regular despatches and other reports to Washington. By 1962, if not earlier, Canada’s diplomat-spies were providing covert HUMINT directly to
Washington, often using a special CIA-supplied, secure communications system. The intelligence collection encompassed a range of sources, including some agents. In postwar MI6 terminology (which External Affairs did not use), most of these sources were “casuals” but some were “occasional.” One of the Canadian embassy’s occasional had been close to Castro and others in the Cuban leadership and still came into contact with families of government officials, and thus was privy to inside information and gossip. Other sources were Canadians travelling in Cuba whose observations embassy personnel duly forwarded to Ottawa, with or without the knowledge of those providing the information. This practice was a standard procedure running in parallel with the Interview Program.

As in Indochina, some of the collection was “tasked,” as a result of highly specific requests from United States intelligence. During the Cuban missile crisis in fall 1962, for example, Washington sought Canadian assistance on numerous occasions and the Canadian information was sometimes disseminated to the highest levels. John F. Kennedy’s advisory group, the ExComm [Executive Committee], appears to have discussed certain intelligence supplied by the Canadian ambassador in Havana, George Kidd. The information requested during the crisis ranged from whether the Cuban government was jamming the regular broadcasts of the Voice of America to assessments of the Cuban public’s reaction to the discovery of Soviet nuclear missiles in their country. Canadian diplomats also monitored the Soviet missile withdrawal, as did their British counterparts.

One report from Ambassador Kidd provided the first indication to Washington that Soviet handling of the crisis had caused a serious rift between Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev. Later, Washington urgently sought the Canadian ambassador’s view on the veracity of French intelligence reports that a post-crisis leadership struggle had broken out around Fidel Castro. Ambassador Kidd disputed the French reports, which in the end proved erroneous. Kidd privately indicated he believed the French ambassador in Havana to be less than reliable.

Following the missile crisis, the American intelligence community was no less concerned about U.S.S.R military and communication installations in Cuba. By the mid-1960s, the Soviets had built the largest Soviet SIGINT facility in the world at Lourdes, southeast of Havana. This facility’s proximity to the U.S. provided the KGB a splendid opportunity to eavesdrop on American domestic communications. Withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962 may have meant that Soviet premier Khrushchev had “lost a fist” but, with the Lourdes facility, he “had gained an ear.”

The base became a target for America’s intelligence-gathering friends. While they had no access to the facility, they could gain useful information merely from observing the types of aerials and other equipment installed there. This work aided American SIGINT operations and U.S. counterintelligence measures aiming at thwarting interception of American signals by Lourdes.

One of the last covert operations involving Canadian diplomats targeted the construction of a base for Soviet nuclear submarines near Cienfuegos. This became a high profile issue prompting repeated Washington intelligence requests to the Canadians and British in Havana. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger perceived the potential base as an example of the Soviets pushing the limits of superpower agreements. He viewed it as violating the understanding by President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev to resolve the 1962 missile crisis. Under that unwritten agreement, Moscow promised to remove all Soviet nuclear weapons from Cuba and to refrain from re-introducing them. Moscow hoped that building the submarine base offshore permitted the claim that it technically still had no nuclear weapons on Cuban soil.

One of the Havana-based Canadian diplomats teamed up with a U.K. embassy counterpart, likely a British SIS operative, to monitor the project’s progress through their personal surveillance of the construction site and they recruited at least one agent from amongst workers at the site. The two made regular intelligence reports to Washington. Thus informed, and probably armed as well with U.S. satellite photos of the construction work, Kissinger confronted the Soviets. The construction stopped, and the Cienfuegos crisis passed. The two nuclear superpowers concluded the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements to usher in the 1970s period of détente.

Case 3: Tehran, 1979-80

The third case of External Affairs foreign intelligence cooperation with the United States arose in the aftermath of the takeover by Iranian students of the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979. While most embassy staff became hostages, six Americans escaped the embassy compound. The Canadian ambassador, Kenneth Taylor, and colleagues and spouses hid these individuals and eventually secured their escape from Iran in January 1980.
This is not a new story. Canadian scholars have known the gist and many details for decades. They first came to light in The Canadian Caper, a 1981 book by Jean Pelletier and Claude Adams. A new book on the Tehran affair, published with some fanfare in 2010, adds modestly to details of the intelligence operations. Documentary evidence of Canadian intelligence efforts in this case are limited. What we do know, however, makes clear that this is another significant (albeit time-limited) case of Canadian foreign intelligence cooperation.

For about two months, from late November through late January, the Canadian embassy gathered information of two unusual types, in addition to its regular diplomatic reporting. Some of the covert intelligence helped to formulate an escape plan for the six “houseguests” – an operation that came to successful fruition on 27 January 1980. A second set was intelligence relevant to an American rescue mission of the larger group of hostages. Canada’s contacts in the American intelligence community were the State Department and the CIA.

The Carter administration began planning for a rescue mission early in the embassy hostage crisis, but Washington divulged little to Ottawa about the preparations. The Canadians nevertheless realized that such a mission was a possibility. The intelligence of most interest to the mission planners focussed on the security situation at the American embassy (number of guards, access points, etc.) and possible routes for American commandos to use in Tehran. In response, Ambassador Taylor checked out landmarks, roads, traffic, and the frequency of military patrols while driving around Tehran. He compiled a list of what he called “bus stops” – potential landing spots for rescue helicopters. Taylor also collected information from other Westerners who had had occasional access to the hostages inside the embassy.

One Canadian, Sergeant Jim Edward, apparently assisted with gathering rescue mission HUMINT. During December Edward was conducting external surveillance of the captured U.S. embassy and the security situation there. Edward was stopped while walking near the embassy and held temporarily by Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers. Ambassador Taylor immediately ordered him to leave Iran, out of concern for his personal safety. The Canadians also worked with a CIA operative, who focused largely on hostage rescue mission details. (The Carter Administration eventually launched a rescue operation in April 1980; it was aborted before the rescue forces even reached Tehran, with significant loss of American lives.)

The Tehran case provides another example of External Affairs’ foreign intelligence efforts; a case of opportunity merging with need. It differs from the Indochina and Cuba cases only in scale; it was much more limited in duration and extent. The Tehran operation lasted only about two months and focussed on the escape and possible rescue mission. The Indochina and Cuba operations each lasted more than a decade and covered a variety of issues.

Conclusion
Declassified documents show that Canada and the United States established an intelligence relationship more than a half century ago, one that went beyond SIGINT. We trace the development of this relationship between the Canadian intelligence community and OSS during the war and then the CIA and the State Department (especially its intelligence unit, INR) after the war. Given Canada lacked a foreign intelligence agency (and still does) the lead organization involved on the Canadian side was the Department of External Affairs. The department maintaining units dedicated to collecting, assessing, and disseminating intelligence within the government, and sharing it with friends and allies.

Other documents and interviews show Canada conducted Cold War-era “episodic” intelligence operations. These were conducted by External Affairs to support Canada’s allies, especially the United States. The operations involved overt and covert human intelligence collection and assessment, including some use of agents. The operations can be described as ‘episodic’ since they were not ongoing operations but temporally finite, and arose in special circumstances to meet an allied requirement. For two of these operations (Indochina and Cuba), we now have considerable evidence. One (Teheran) is at present less well documented. Other cases where Canada similarly worked with the CIA and State Department almost certainly exist for which details have yet to come to light.
1. Westerfield, “America and the World of Intelligence Liaison” Intelligence and National Security, 11(3), July 1996, 523. Liaison is more prominent in the British intelligence literature (as Westerfield observes), likely because of the importance to Britain of the longstanding United Kingdom-United States relationship. A more recent review of the intelligence literature reaffirmed a lack of attention afforded intelligence cooperation. Len Scott and Peter Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice” Intelligence and National Security, 10(2), Summer 2004, 139-169. That situation may nevertheless be changing at last. See, for example, Sir Stephen Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17(3), 2004, 481; Chris Clough, “Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17(4), 604; and Jennifer Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals and Details” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 19(2), 2006, 195-217. Michael Herman’s text (Intelligence Power in Peace and War) contains a full chapter on international cooperation, while most U.S. intelligence studies texts completely ignore the subject. Supporting Westerfield, Aldrich quotes a veteran CIA officer saying that prior to 1963, “most” CIA-intelligence collection “was carried out through liaison arrangements” (Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, Woodstock, Overlook, 2001, 644).


4. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 207.

5. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 81. Aldrich also quotes a veteran CIA officer to the effect that, prior to 1963, “most” CIA-intelligence collection “was carried out through liaison arrangements” (Aldrich, 644).


9. The circumstances and the extent of the ties between Canadian intelligence and OSS at this time have not emerged in released documents but the letter of introduction for Norman which was sent to Allen Dulles by Thomas Stone was friendly and on a first name basis, clearly suggesting familiarity and friendly cooperation. Thomas Stone was the early head of External Affairs’ foreign intelligence function and its driving force. By late 1942, he had been posted to the Legation in Washington. Ibid., Stone to Dulles, October 28, 1942.


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14. Ibid. Pearson was a senior official in External Affairs who became the minister during the 1950s and was recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. In the 1960s he became prime minister.

18. LAC MG26 J13 King Diaries, Fiche 194, October 27, 1943.
25. Ibid.
29. Bowen had initially been lent to Canada by the British JIB. He succeeded George Glazebrook, an External Affairs intelligence officer, who returned to the department to head DL2. Bowen was a National Defence employee by this time and headed CJIB until its merger with foreign intelligence at External Affairs in 1968.
30. LAC RG24, Vol. 6178, File 24-14-5. Memorandum, Chiefs of Staff Committee, February 28, 1951, and Chiefs of Staff Committee to Chairman, [CJIC, April 24, 1951; and DND 73/1223 Series 9, File 3 170 Intelligence. Extract from the Minutes of the 261st Meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, undated; Letter from Foulkes to Bedell Smith, March 7, 1951; Letter from Smith to Foulkes, April 3, 1951.
31. Jensen, p. 11.
32. DND 73/1223, Series 9, File 3170 Intelligence. Foulkes to Glazebrook, June 3, 1952.
34. DND. 73/1223 Series 9, File 3170 Intelligence. Foulkes to Glazebrook, June 3, 1952.
36. Glazebrook had headed the CJIB until 1950.
38. Although a Canadian intelligence liaison officer was eventually stationed in Washington, the date when this first occurred has not been found in archival document.
41. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s, New Zealand had no original sources of information concerning Indochina; thus, it relied on intelligence collected by Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. See, for instance, Telegram, High Commissioner for Canada to External Affairs, 446, “United Kingdom Views on Vietnam,” 2 December 1955, LAC, RG 25, File 50052-40, Vol. 4627, Part 40. See also a despatch from a Canadian Ambassador in Italy to Ottawa who points out Canada’s role in sharing of the interim reports from Indochina, writing that disseminating the reports was “a difficult and unpleasant task for Canada” but “someone in the Western world had to undertake it and perhaps Canada was the most qualified.” Despatch, Canadian Ambassador, Rome to External Affairs, 187, “Indochina – International Supervisory Commission,” 15 March 1955, LAC, RG 25, File 50052-40, Vol. 4631, Part 9.
45. John Holmes, who came to be in charge of the Canadian ICSC operations, including the intelligence collection, later said: “Canadian team members do provide useful intelligence


47. Telegram, Canadian Ambassador, Washington to External Affairs, WA-1302, 24 July 1954.


51. Eayrs, 246.


53. See, for instance, Numbered Letter, Ambassador, Washington to External Affairs, 785, “Indochina Commission – Weekly Telegraphic Summaries,” 11 May 1955, LAC, RG 25, File 50052-A-40, Vol. 4631, Part 12. The document includes the U.S. State Department’s views on Canada’s weekly reports from Indochina, expressing a desire to keep receiving these reports, saying that “there can never be too much information from the State Department’s point of view.”


55. Moreover, if espionage were in fact an accepted part of ICSC members’ jobs, it was a role to which Ross himself, perhaps curiously, gives very little attention in a longish book. Espionage for the United States would also not be a role that supported Ross’ theme that Canadian foreign policy in Indochina was devoted to maintaining world peace in the face of American aggressiveness.

56. Eayrs, 249.

57. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy, 180.


60. Canada did not post military attachés to Havana in the 1960s or 1970s. National Defence proposed the idea but External Affairs opposed it, in part because the Cuban government would assume that the main task of the attachés was to gather intelligence, and their presence at the embassy might then focus Cuban attention on the intelligence work of the diplomats.


62. Confidential interview.
63. The frequent process of the embassy in Havana reporting to External Affairs the observations of Canadian travelers in Cuba represents, in effect, a parallel activity to that of the Ottawa-based Interview Program.


66. Bamford.

67. John Graham, Interview with Munton, Ottawa.


72. Jean Pelletier and Claude Adams, The Canadian Caper: The Inside Story of the Daring Rescue of Six American Diplomats Trapped in Tehran, Macmillan, Toronto, 1981. Pelletier had intrepidly determined the basic facts of the hidden Americans in late 1979, well before the exfiltration, while the Canadians were still harbouring them. To his great credit he had refused to publish the story until after the successful escape in order to protect those involved.

73. Robert Wright, Our Man in Tehran: Ken Taylor, the CIA and the Iran Hostage Crisis, Harper Collins, 2010. In the preface to Our Man, Wright states his book is “piecing together this story for the first time” (xii). Later he claims that “the Canadian role in intelligence gathering ... has until now remained virtually unnoticed” (222). The book jacket declares “The true story behind the daring escape has never been told.” All these claims overlook the Pelletier and Adams book, of which Wright was aware. He cites the Pelletier and Claude Adams book numerous times in his own book but refrains from giving it any credit for exposing the intelligence aspects of the story.

74. Pelletier and Adams, Canadian Caper, 184-5.

75. Wright, Our Man in Tehran, 237.