

**When in Doubt, Reorganize:
Canadian Defence Intelligence from Unification Through the ‘Decade of Darkness’**

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Abstract

The period from 1965 to 2000 was one of constant change for Canadian Defence Intelligence (DI). In the name of efficiency – the search for the optimal DI architecture to serve the needs of national command and decision-making – it was subjected to several major reorganizations. Each was intended to remedy the shortfalls of the previous one. But none of these achieved their desired end-state, because the quest for budget reductions always trumped organizational rationales. Thus, each reorganization was accompanied or followed by reductions in staff in a branch that was very small to start with: less than 1% of the strength of the Canadian Forces (CF) as a whole. Nor could it afford to keep pace with technological change. During the relatively peaceful 1970s and 1980s this was manageable. But from 1990 onward the CF were on a constant operational footing, stretching the DI function to its limits. Thus, on the eve of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, DI was under-staffed, under-equipped, and unprepared for war.

Introduction

This paper could easily be re-titled “When in Debt Reorganize...”, since fiscal restraint was a major driving force behind frequent Canadian Defence Intelligence (DI) reorganization efforts. It examines six phases of reorganization between 1965 and 2000 with a view to explaining what was changed and why. Some of these were more significant than others. While the paper includes some contextual background – the strategic environment and Canadian defence policy – the relevance of which to the changes in DI cannot be dismissed, it would be a mistake to overstate their influence. The ‘bottom line’ in many cases seems to have been the budget. That, in turn, was shaped largely by domestic policy concerns rather than by the international context in which DI had to operate. But a “penny wise, pound foolish” approach to DI organization had operational consequences when the Canadian Forces went to war in Afghanistan. On the eve of that conflict Canadian DI was under-staffed, under-equipped, and unprepared for war.

Canadian Defence Intelligence Prior to Unification (1945-64)

Starting from almost nothing in 1939 the Canadian military and its civilian counterparts had gained considerable intelligence experience during the Second World War.¹ Although many in government and the military understood the value of that experience, as the war ended there was a fractious debate over the shape of a peacetime intelligence community. General Charles Foulkes, who served as Chief of the General Staff from 1945 to 1951, made a case for a full-service national intelligence capability, but was unable to persuade the government of the need for it.² However, after fierce debate it decided in 1945 to retain a SIGINT/COMSEC service, known as the Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC).³ The government also recognized the benefits of wartime intelligence sharing, particularly in the SIGINT field, and after much debate agreed to join the post-war intelligence alliance now referred to as the 'Five Eyes'.⁴ Those decisions meant that Canada would be dependent on their allies for much of their raw and processed defence and military intelligence.

In a July 1947 statement to the House of Commons on Canada's defence needs and organization Minister of National Defence (MND) Brooke Claxton had highlighted a long-term goal: "Joint intelligence and planning groups to review defence appreciations and plans."⁵ Canada retained a limited capacity for independent analysis and assessment in the form of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee (CJIC, formed in 1942) and its Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS), on which all three services and key civilian departments were represented. This ensured that Canadian intelligence assessments would rest at least in part on some degree of 'Canadian' perspective. But its products were directed to the military chiefs of staff and allied agencies, not to senior government decision-makers. Moreover, given Canada's limited collection sources it struggled to develop well-informed assessments.⁶

At the level of the armed forces themselves there was no single DI architecture until Unification (1965). The three services maintained separate intelligence branches, at national

headquarters and within units and formations. At army headquarters up to 1964 the intelligence branch was called the Director or Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), the terms being applied inter-changeably almost year for year. Likewise, naval intelligence was housed within the office of the Director or Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DNI). The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) had a Director or Directorate of Intelligence-Air until 1952, when the term Air Intelligence came into use. Each of these had regional sub-sections, and sections for operations, training, foreign liaison, technical intelligence, security and/or counter-intelligence. But the DMI had limited analysis capability and lacked access to original intelligence sources.⁷ Defence-related scientific intelligence was housed within the Defence Research Board (DRB) until 1965, when it was moved under the new Director General of Intelligence (DGI).⁸

Canadian Forces Unification and Integration 1964-67

Paul Hellyer became MND in 1963, and set out to rectify what he had identified as serious problems in the Canadian Forces: the absence of a single command authority and service voice on military matters; the fact that the Department of National Defence (DND) administered but did not control the armed forces; duplication of functions among three service chains of command and support structures; and the fact that the three services did not work together. This was because Canadian governments had, in effect, surrendered sovereign control of them to international organizations (NATO, NORAD, and the UN), under which they carried out separate, distinct, and mutually non-supporting missions. The (Glassco) Royal Commission on Government Organization report (1962) had praised DND for its effective civil-military staff relations,⁹ but this did not dissuade Hellyer from his determination to make it even better.

His solution to this dilemma was three-fold: first, creation of a single chain of command and an integrated military headquarters and staff, headed by a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), to be the sole military advisor to the MND.¹⁰ Second, DND came under the sole direction of a

Deputy Minister (DM) who reported directly to the minister. Finally, in 1967 the three services were unified into a single service: the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), organized into six tri-service commands: The intention was to make the CF more efficient, more mobile, and better organized to support each other in combined operations.¹¹ This latter goal was defeated by the fact that the government found it could not easily shed its alliance commitments that imposed the different roles and equipment on the forces. After unification they were little more mobile and no more capable of joint operations than they had been before.¹²

The Impact of Unification and Integration on Defence Intelligence

Hellyer's 'reforms' had a profound impact on Canadian Defence Intelligence. First, in 1964 DI was unified and centralized under a single Director-General of Intelligence (DGI), that post being held until 1968 by Brigadier General Lloyd Kenyon, who had served in the DMI 1947 to 1950.¹³ Second, in 1967, following two studies (the second conducted by a DGI working group) the intelligence function was merged with counter-intelligence (Security) and military police to form the Security Branch, under a DG then later Deputy Chief Intelligence and Security (DCIS).¹⁴ This represented an awkward marriage of two related but different tasks. Third, placing the DCIS under the Vice-CDS (VCDS)¹⁵ raised the profile of defence intelligence. This reflected changes in the defence management structure, such that at the NDHQ level DI was now serving two masters: military and civilian.

Creating a new centralized and integrated DI enterprise was no small task. To guide Kenyon in this challenging endeavor, in August 1964 Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (ACDS) Air Vice Marshal Wilfred Bean (Kenyon's immediate superior), laid out the terms of reference for the DGI in detailed and specific language. The DGI (and latterly the DCIS) was to be responsible to the ACDS for:¹⁶

1. "Advice on all aspects of intelligence policy" as required by DND;

2. “Development of policies and plans for the management, operation, future development, and wartime employment of the intelligence resources” of DND;
3. “The efficient management and optimum security of the intelligence resources” of DND;
4. “The production of intelligence on the capabilities, activities, and likely courses of action of foreign armed forces” as required by the CF and DND;
5. “The production of economic and geographic intelligence” for DND and inter-departmental purposes;
6. “The collection of intelligence from such Canadian sources as may be designated from time to time, subject to the concurrence of other departments for activities involving their personnel, interests or responsibilities”;
7. Participation in inter-departmental intelligence committees, such as the Joint Intelligence Committee;
8. “Liaison for intelligence purposes and exchange of intelligence” on behalf of DND with other Canadian government departments;
9. “Cooperation for intelligence purposes and exchange of intelligence” on behalf of DND “with such foreign countries as may be designated from time to time”;
10. “DND policy in regard to foreign attache [sic] activities in Canada”;
11. Management of the Canadian attaché program;
12. “Security policy in conjunction with Directorate of Security”.

This was a tall order. The detailed guidance above notwithstanding, ACDS Bean gave Kenyon a free hand to develop and run the directorate. His reflections on this period, recorded in interviews years later, shed some useful light on how he carried out his mandate.

Upon arrival, Kenyon was dismayed to find that senior NDHQ officers were apathetic with regard to intelligence matters. Fortunately, the second CDS (General Jean V. Allard) was

“intensely interested” in intelligence, as he had been an attaché in Moscow. Likewise, Defence Minister Hellyer was very supportive; he received regular intelligence briefings. Hellyer did, however, order substantial reductions in military personnel strength that impacted defence intelligence.¹⁷ In December 1964 ACDS Bean presented his terms of reference and setup to the Defence Council, which was looking at proposed command structure. Bean said his staff couldn’t be reduced by 30% and still do the work. He got support from Arthur Menzies (External Affairs) “to shore up his contention that the intelligence group would suffer if cut substantially.” But Hellyer wasn’t convinced. He wrote in his diary: “We are spending far too much money in this area.”¹⁸ At this time the DGI had 140 staff, so Kenyon (actually told to expect a 10% cut) would lose 14. He made the savings among the support staff, so that DGI did not lose analytic capability. He shifted the analytic function from service-based to topic-based, with tri-service teams covering most functional topics.¹⁹ By November 1965, DGI had five directorates, including Operations (attachés), and Production, the latter having five sub-sections.²⁰

In November 1965 the DGI had absorbed the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence (DSI), which heretofore had been housed in the Defence Research Board. The director of DSI (L. G. Eon) had initially told Kenyon that the scientists wanted to be directed by other scientists, and did not want to come under military command. However, according to Kenyon, after he included some DSI analysts in a briefing to the Minister, Eon changed his tune. He told the DGI: “I’ve never seen intelligence get to the top before ... all these big papers we write, nobody ever reads those. You’re getting the intelligence right in there.”²¹ With the understanding that the DGI would not micro-manage scientific work, which would be directed by a scientist, the DSI moved over to DGI, and became the Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DSTI).²²

The DGI “downgraded” the status of the CJIC. It produced a limited number of intelligence studies and, while he thought the quality was very good, Kenyon did not believe

Cabinet ever read their papers or used them to support decision-making. So, he stopped the current intelligence briefings to the CJIC, reassigned the briefing team to the intelligence production directorate, and worked to improve the quality of briefings to senior officials – all in an effort to “sell” the value of intelligence to decision-makers. In 1966, the DGI had given an *in-camera* briefing to House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence “of the type that is routine for congressmen in Washington, but was unheard of in Canada except in wartime.”²³ As a result, political leaders began to show greater appreciation for it. Prime Minister Lester Pearson, in particular, had a good grasp of international issues, and valued Kenyon’s efforts. By contrast Pierre Trudeau, showed little interest in intelligence when he first became Prime Minister.²⁴

The DGI was also acutely aware of the risk of being too dependent on the United States for intelligence – that the US intelligence community sent a lot of material to their Canadian counterparts with the clear intention of persuading them to accept the US view on issues that mattered to them. And via the CBNRC’s SIGINT program, Canada was also a net intelligence contributor to the US. In return it received more ‘finished’ intelligence than it could consume, but having access to it when needed was important. During Kenyon’s tenure the intercept stations were transferred to DGI control, adding some 1,500 personnel to his organization.²⁵

DGI’s photo interpretation unit received satellite photos from the CIA and DIA, which did not have enough capacity to process all of the photos they collected. Neither did the DGI, but Kenyon worked hard to get the extra staff and new computers needed to do so. This also entailed building – at great cost to DND – a special secure room, accessible only to “the tightest controlled list” of people cleared to see the photos. The high security was intended to limit knowledge of the degree of resolution the American satellite cameras could achieve. By agreement with the US and UK, Canadian analysis focused on Soviet and Chinese aerospace and

naval forces (missiles, in particular), and Soviet and Warsaw Pact theatre forces.²⁶ When analysed alongside other sources, this imagery material was, in Kenyon's words,

most useful as confirmatory evidence in process of analysis of Soviet strengths and capabilities and future developments. It hardens the process of estimation into 'near certainty' and thus is an invaluable tool of analysis. It is becoming the primary tool of strategic intelligence collection and analysis in respect to foreign armed forces.²⁷

It was, he added, "one of our most valuable sources."²⁸

When Kenyon relinquished his position in 1968, he left behind a larger, more integrated, and more comprehensive defence intelligence organization than he had inherited four years earlier. As Director General Intelligence and Security (DGIS), he oversaw the work and staffs of seven sections: Intelligence Production; Intelligence Services (which provided essential support functions); Intelligence Operations; Scientific and Technical Intelligence; Foreign Liaison; Security; and (until disbanded) the JIB.²⁹ The absence of service-specific sections is striking; this was a truly tri-service directorate. Just as the forces themselves were still making the transition to full integration and unification, the DGIS probably still fell short of meeting all of the CF's and DND's goals and needs. The merger of intelligence with Security would remain troubled throughout its duration. But Kenyon and his staff had laid a foundation for unified DI – the starting point from which defence intelligence supported CF operations in the period 1970 to 2000. Reflecting the state of the strategic environment at the end of the 1960s, Canadian intelligence priorities and collection efforts at that time were focused primarily on the Soviet Union's military intentions and capabilities. But, they did not anticipate a general war between the USSR and NATO.³⁰ The Cold War was tense, but it was largely stable and predictable.

DND Inherits SIGINT (1975-77)

The most significant change in Canadian intelligence during the 1970s occurred in April 1975, when the CBNRC was transferred to DND and became the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). The question of authority and responsibility for SIGINT had been raised during the 1970 Intelligence Policy Committee (IPC)-commissioned review of the Canadian intelligence program carried out by senior civil servant Claude Isbister.

Starting in 1960, at least in theory, overall SIGINT policy had been the responsibility of the (inter-departmental) IPC. The Director of Communications Security (DCS - who was also the chair of the CJIC and head of intelligence and security within External Affairs) was, in turn responsible for executing those policies, maintaining relations with CBNRC's foreign partners (the 'Five Eyes'), and for planning and controlling its budget. But by 1970 the IPC had all but ceased to function. So, in fact, operational responsibility was divided between the CBNRC's director, who managed the SIGINT processing and reporting programs, and DND which looked after staffing, administration, and maintenance (of the intercept stations). Isbister stressed that the existing system was unwieldy, since the DCS had no authority over DND's SIGINT tasks, and the position was over-tasked and untenable. He recommended that the DCS position be terminated, with the director of the CBNRC assuming all managerial duties for that service.³¹

The idea of moving the service seems to have been raised first in 1971 by the Director of Britain's GCHQ. He had learned from MGen Roland Reid (then DCIS) that the NRC apparently was quite eager to rid itself of the responsibility for SIGINT. At that point MGen Reid did not have in mind any alternate host for the service.³² But unexpected media reporting forced the government's hand. In 1974, a CBC documentary did an exposé on the CBNRC SIGINT role,³³ which heretofore had been the most highly guarded Canadian secret, as had been common with all western SIGINT agencies since World War II. This prompted the government to act. Meeting on 15 January 1975, the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence confirmed the NRC's

discomfort with the SIGINT task, and that the publicity about it had been an “important factor” in bringing about a review of its status. A memorandum to cabinet recommended the transfer of CBNRC to DND, where it would be renamed CSE. Unwelcome publicity aside, this made sense financially and administratively, since DI operated the (then) five intercept stations, and DND provided \$24 million of the \$32 million SIGINT budget.³⁴

But, since CSE was regarded as a national asset, it was not integrated into the DI structure. Instead, it was a stand-alone unit within DND, reporting to the MND, with the new Inter-departmental Committee on Security and Intelligence (ICSI) responsible for SIGINT policy, although there was some uncertainty about what ‘policy’ meant in the SIGINT context. Moreover, there was some sentiment inside CSE that its head should be responsible for policy, and that the position should be held by a full-time SIGINT professional.³⁵ But in 1977 the ICSI’s Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) vested control of SIGINT in bifurcated form: the IAC had control for ‘national’ [i.e. non-military] SIGINT, while the DCDS controlled “tactical COMINT and ELINT for operational purposes”.³⁶ All of that notwithstanding, DI remained the primary consumer of SIGINT products generated by CSE³⁷ or shared by its Five Eyes partners.

Defence Intelligence Structure and Direction 1976-84

DI underwent a major internal reorganization between 1976 and 1984. Given the timing, it is possible that it was part of the Defence Structure Review, which was intended to reconcile defence policies, force structures, commitments, and the defence budget.³⁸ But available sources say only that the Directorate of Intelligence Production (DINTP) ‘shop’ was examined at the direction of the DGIS to establish a new structure. Details and proposals were included, but they do not offer a rationale as to why such changes might be necessary.³⁹

The more likely backdrop to this was the re-shaping of the command and authority structure within DND. By February 1973, the dual-function operational branch headed by the

VCDS disappeared, replaced by a single DCDS and “the VCDS was relieved of direct operational responsibilities.”⁴⁰ Instead, the VCDS became the chief “manager” of NDHQ, and from 1973 the DCDS became the “chief operator” of the forces. Assisted by a joint staff, that office had inherited most of the responsibilities previously exercised by the vice-chiefs of the three services: the traditional aspects of operational planning, training, and overseeing the day-to-day operations of the CF, but with the exceptions of intelligence, plans and operational requirements that had had been delegated to the ACDS. So, his authority was fragmented. This remained largely unchanged until 1985. In the view of Douglas Bland’s authoritative study of Canadian defence administration, this represented “the complete loss of the continuity of policy and command and control once enjoyed by the CDS/VCDS.”⁴¹

The new structure was laid out in the DND phonebook. Under the DGIS (BGen Reg Weeks) were four directors, for: Defence Intelligence (DDI); Intelligence and Security Program Support (DISPS); Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DSTI); and Security. The DDI section previously had been DINTP. It now had three estimates cells (strategic, general purpose, and stability), but also included a new unit: the National Defence Intelligence Center (NDIC). Its role can be divined from the staff taskings: collating, preparing, and delivering current intelligence briefings.⁴² This presumably would include Indications and Warnings. The DISPS brought under one ‘roof’ a range of supporting services for both the intelligence and security functions, including foreign liaison. The DSTI structure remained unchanged.⁴³

The changes did not stop there. In 1979, barely three years after it was created, the DISPS position vanished. In its place the DGIS took under direct supervision several functions: operations, plans and training; administration; production; and attaché administration. The DDI and Security branches were untouched, but foreign liaison got its own director. However, it is not clear how the work of intelligence production was shared between the new section and the DDI.

The following year DSTI was reorganized and reduced from five topic sections (weapons systems, electronic systems, missiles and space, advanced weapons [nuclear, CW, BW], and science and technology) to three: technical intelligence, scientific intelligence, and systems analysis. But the new sections still examined the same topics. Technical Intelligence looked at the major conventional weapons. Scientific Intelligence looked at the advanced and strategic weapons (missiles), while Systems Analysis focused on space systems, activities and telemetry. DSTI also was responsible for the National Special Center (the secure room for handling imagery from US sources), but Security vetted and controlled access to it. But by 1982 DDI added a section to handle Imagery Exploitation. And a Chief of Intelligence and Security (CIS) replaced the DGIS in the reporting chain to the VCDS. These changes were in effect by 1982.⁴⁴

The CIS was described as the departmental advisor on intelligence and security. That role included responsibilities for: developing policies and plans for and managing the intelligence and security resources of DND; planning and directing production and dissemination of DI for DND and other departments; advising on DND security, and deciding and implementing security policies and procedures for the department; planning and directing law enforcement and custodial programs for DND; and controlling the activities of CF attachés and advisors and of foreign attachés advisors accredited to Canada; and serving on the two sub-committees of ICSI: the IAC and the Security Advisory Committee (SAC).⁴⁵

If this were not enough, the CIS also exercised authority over the National Defence Intelligence Centre (NDIC – the 24/7 Watch section), the Directorate of Imagery Exploitation (DIE) and the National Special Centre (NSC) that handled US-supplied overhead imagery. He directed planning and collection activities to acquire DI; represented the branch on inter-departmental and international programs for production and exchange of DI; controlled development of branch objectives, priorities and standards for production and dissemination of

intelligence; exercised technical control of the SRS (CSE's intercept stations); carried out a range of tasks related to security; advised on training at the CFSIS; and was expected to serve as "the focal point for professional defence intelligence and security knowledge within the department."⁴⁶ In addition to reporting to the VCDS, the CIS would provide support to the MND and DM, and consult and liaise with ADMs, the DCDS, commanders of Commands, other government departments, and foreign and international staffs and agencies. In turn, the CIS was supported by the directors of Intelligence, Security, and Intelligence and Security Support.⁴⁷

By 1984 many of these duties had been delegated to his subordinate: the DGINT. The DGINT was deemed responsible for: developing priorities for production of basic, current, strategic, scientific and technical intelligence; allocating resources to meet those objectives; tasking CF attachés and defence advisors with collection requirements, and participating in training them; briefing and de-briefing outgoing and incoming CF attachés and other government officials; advising the CIS on personnel and training matters; maintaining the flow of intelligence and liaison between the Five Eyes; maintaining and developing resource requirements; maintaining and updating the DDI intelligence data bases on foreign forces, their defence budgets, commanders, STI, and climate and topographical information; through the NDIC, monitoring indications and warning; and reviewing current intelligence to select items to brief the CIS, CDS, National Defence Operations Centre, and others in DND and government.⁴⁸

The DGINT would be responsible for providing intelligence support during crises by maintaining the NDIC, and providing studies and in-depth analysis of threats to Canada, North America, and global stability. He would also maintain liaison with foreign intelligence agencies on behalf of the CIS, and participate in international intelligence conferences intended to produce agreed estimates for NATO, NORAD, and other arrangements. Finally, he would serve as the

intelligence advisor to the CIS, and attend the IAC as an ex-officio member, but serve as a permanent member of its priorities, requirements and resources sub-committee.⁴⁹

The extant documents explain what was changed in these relationships, but don't explain why. The answer may lie in the DGIS leadership. It had three different commanders during the years 1976-82. B/MGen Reg Weeks (land force), BGen Walter Dabros (military police), and Cmdre/RAdm John Rodocanachi.⁵⁰ Within bureaucracies it is common for leaders to try to put their 'stamp' on the units under their command. One way to do that is to change structures to better suit their operating style. Or they may have decided that the existing structures were not fulfilling the needs of the unit. Unfortunately, I saw no sources that indicated whether the new arrangement made DI function more efficiently. And the fact that the branch was subjected to constant changes thereafter does not prove this case one way or the other.

Coordinating Intelligence Production 1984-88

The effort to develop a structure to control and coordinate intelligence production is a case in point for highlighting the problems of pursuing change without a clear end-state in mind. In 1984 the DGINT had added a production planning coordinator (PPC), a director of current intelligence (DCI) to run the NDIC, and had assigned the director of imagery exploitation to run the CF Joint Imagery Centre, which had been brought under the DGINT's authority.⁵¹ The PPC position had been proposed by the DDI. It was created officially in May 1984, although it doesn't appear in the DND directory until 1985. A January 1986 review of the position offered a clear rationale for it:

“Within DDI there was no cohesive and coherent intelligence production plan beyond

section head level. Consequently, deadlines were being missed and some essential intelligence never was disseminated because there was no cell specifically designated to oversee production, planning and coordination.”⁵²

Likewise, the resources of the CF attaché program were being squandered due to an absence of collection, tasking, and control. Overall, there was no quality control of intelligence products.⁵³

However, in spite of a persuasive case to create it, the PPC was assigned eight staff positions, but started with only one major (later two), and was largely unable to fulfil its mandate due to a continuing personnel shortfall. As a result, the mandate was limited to determining intelligence requirements and production, and editing selected intelligence products. In fact, the review said that the PPC was functioning “more as a coordination/odd jobs cell than as a collection and production management organization.”⁵⁴ This criticism is supported by the myriad of tasks assigned to the PPC outside of its even limited mandate. These included: acting as the repository for CIS “canned” briefings; developing the CIS’ briefing program; coordinating visits to DGINT; assisting in preparing the CIS intelligence analyst course, and maintaining the course handbook; preparing the CIS’ *Weekly Intelligence Review (WIR)* for the MND, DM, CDS, and VCDS. The head of PPC (then Major Patrick Crandell) noted that, as a result, “the fulfilment of PPC primary responsibilities has suffered accordingly.”⁵⁵

He went on to elaborate on the problems facing the PPC: separation of collection and production management from operations and plans; duplication of effort; lack of PPC control over attaché collection, *WIR* production, and quality and dissemination of reports. He described the latter as being in “disarray” due to the absence of any central distribution control authority. On the separation issue, Crandell noted that Operations, Plans and Training (OP&T),

“has developed the intelligence planning input to national-level plans/operations without reference to or cognizance of specified national or allied collection requirements

or production programmes which may have impacted on the plan and planning process. Conversely, PPC has developed force-wide requirements without linkage to national plans ... The only guaranteed way of eliminating this problem is to integrate, organizationally, PPC's collection and production management functions with OP&T's operations and plans responsibilities."⁵⁶

In addition, he recommended that PPC be divested of responsibility for attaché control and for the *WIR*, which he felt should be retained by the CIS's attaché administration branch and by the DDI, respectively. In fact, he felt that most of the tasks assigned to PPC should be handed back to the units originally tasked to do them, leaving PPC with intelligence collection and production management, dissemination control, production of selected intelligence publications, and liaison with OGDs and Agencies and the CF to support these activities. This, he argued, would require a staff of five, of whom only two would be officers.⁵⁷

The CIS heeded this advice, at least in the short term. In the new structure announced in December 1986 the PPC had been moved directly under the DGINT. At the same time, the new Directorate of Intelligence Plans and Doctrine (DIPD) had absorbed OP&T.⁵⁸ By fall 1987 the PPC had vanished from the DND directory, but it remained within the DGINT structure.⁵⁹ But by August 1988, however, it had become Section 5 within DIPD. This change apparently had not solved the problems that had plagued the PPC in 1986. Many of the tasks that had been removed from its mandate then (such as *WIR* production) had been reassigned to DIPD5, along with some additional ones. The head of DIPD5 (Major Binda) complained that: intelligence requirements had been formulated, but not circulated to producers, and were not coordinated with production or dissemination; there was no coherent or cohesive collection plan in the [DGINT] division; there was no production or quality control; attaché collection, tasking, and control was neglected; and intelligence products were being circulated without reference to stated requirements. In fact,

he agreed with LCol Crandell's 1986 assessment of PPC's problems. Binda strongly urged that DIPD5 "be allowed to function in the manner for which it was formed ... 'Production and Dissemination control'."⁶⁰ He identified the tasks he felt the section should retain, and those that should be shed. It was very similar to Crandell's list. The fact that he had to make this plea two years after the section review shows clearly that the reorganization of PPC either had not been implemented properly or had failed. The need for intelligence production coordination had been clear enough. What was lacking was a plan that would integrate the position effectively into the existing DI structure. The result was organizational disruption, and failure to fulfil the intent of the reorganization.

The Tail Wags the Dog: Automation Versus Staffing 1984-96

DGIS began planning for the gradual introduction of automated data processing in 1973, following the lead of the US intelligence community, which was the source of much of DND's intelligence data. By the end of the 1970s DGIS had acquired one system: an interactive graphics display for missile telemetry analysis. An automated message-handling system (identical to that used by the DIA) was to be in place within the NDIC by March 1980. A third area for ADP introduction was imagery analysis. These were only the preliminary requirements. Further advances toward automation were expected to take until 1990.⁶¹

In 1983 DSTI added an intelligence and security automation (computerization) section, which got its own director (DISA) in 1984. By 1988, the DISA had been moved directly under the CIS.⁶² The creation of this position makes sense in light of the decision in 1984 to acquire computerized data processing capability "to produce strategic military intelligence and handle security information in an automated environment."⁶³ Two factors drove this change: the

increasing volume of intelligence that had to be processed manually, and the expectation that by the 1990s most American material would be in digital form, which would be unavailable to DND if it did not move to automation as well.⁶⁴

The 1987 defence white paper promised greater defence spending and a significant upgrading of the forces.⁶⁵ But even before the ending of the Cold War called into question its basic assumptions – and the plans that flowed therefrom – the government decided to rein in its ambitious defence spending plans.⁶⁶ This presented the CIS and DG INT with serious cost/personnel challenges, complicated by the need to move into the computer age.

In a March 1988 memo to the VCDS (LGen Jack Vance), the CIS (MGen Bill Hewson) expressed “very serious misgivings about the impact on my Branch of the current force development process.”⁶⁷ The proposed force levels were set at roughly current establishments, and made no allowance for promised additional positions, personnel needed to set up and run the ISX (the intelligence and security computerization) project, or for additional security officers needed to implement the new government security policy and other tasks. CIS would have forego new positions and function within its current staffing levels. These decisions, made without consultation, cast aside four years of planning for regular and reserve wartime establishments, and the progress made for approval of the new automated systems deemed essential if the CF and the government “are to benefit from the vastly improved intelligence capabilities and security procedures which are now possible.”⁶⁸ Hewson complained bluntly that,

“My staff is being directed to accept an unrealistic personnel ceiling ... and then to produce a plan which will lead to an organization less capable than the one which now exists. They are loyally doing so despite the futility of their exercise.”⁶⁹

He followed up a few days later with a longer memo, laying out in detail the negative implications of the proposed personnel ceilings and reductions. The problem, as Hewson saw it,

was that the Total Force Development Plan (TFDP) required a reduction in CIS staff positions that already had been allocated to meet needs of well-advanced plans like the ISX. He requested that the supplement to the CIS Branch development plan be consulted with the plan itself.⁷⁰

The CIS supplement asserted that the primary deficiencies in DND strategic intelligence production and security capabilities were lack of personnel and lack of computer support. It pointed out that although the CIS branch was “the primary DND producer of strategic foreign intelligence”, it lacked sufficient people to do the job. Five years earlier the VCDS had approved a manpower review that identified a personnel shortfall of over 100 positions. CIS had received 29 new people, with a further 17 promised for FY 1988/89, but would lose all of these under the branch ceiling proposed in the TFDP. This would reduce CIS’ strategic intelligence production to “a barely acceptable level”, and would put at risk the ability to meet its intelligence-sharing obligations. The effect of this shortfall would be exacerbated by the lack of adequate computer support. In this area CIS was 10-15 years behind the US military intelligence community.⁷¹

While CIS had some computer support, there was no integrated architecture, so “the bulk of all-source collation, analysis and production is performed without the benefit of automation.”⁷² The ISX project was designed to solve this problem, and was vital to ensure inter-operability with Canada’s allies by 1998. But implementing it required 73 positions to operate and manage the ISX project effectively. Hewson insisted that, “These positions must be accepted as a legitimate requirement in excess of the CDS allocation.”⁷³ He also requested that the planned expansion of the attaché program be allowed to proceed.

Hewson received no sympathy from the VCDS, LGen Jack Vance, who asked him to allow the force development process to move forward. Vance stated that “all branches will be expected to manage within a personnel establishment that will give DND the minimum viable structure to implement the White Paper initiatives.” He added that the force development process

was meant “to ensure that a balanced solution is found that will enable DND to operate effectively and efficiently in peacetime and, if necessary, during war.”⁷⁴ At this point the extant document record goes silent on this debate for over a year. In the meantime, that summer Vance retired, and Hewson was posted to SHAPE, succeeded as CIS briefly (one year) by MGen R. Percival Pattee, then by RAdm John Slade, who served as CIS from 1989 through 1991.⁷⁵

The exchange between Hewson and Vance reveals two competing ‘visions’ of the need for DI and how the capability should be maintained. Hewson’s view was that strategic DI was a ‘foundational’ capability within DND that served the department’s needs, those of the wider government, and of Canada’s allies. That capacity could be sustained only by an unavoidable investment in people and systems, and the CIS branch had been assured that its basic staffing needs would be met. But the CF’s TFDP undermined its ability to perform its primary functions, and risked Canadian DI falling even further behind, unable to interact with its allies.

It is well known that bureaucracies resist change, especially reductions, but Hewson’s case does not appear to have been special pleading. He was able to demonstrate the costs arising from the personnel ceilings and reductions. The VCDS, on the other hand, faced pressures of a different nature: implementing an ambitious defence policy in a time of fiscal constraint, and a consequent effort to restructure the forces in a way that would serve policy, meet budget goals, and still yield effective military power. The Total Force concept may have been unrealistic given the state of the Reserves and the budgetary limits facing the CF, but the VCDS had no choice but to try to make force development work. In order to ensure that the wider project reached its goal, there would have to be adjustments in all of the parts that made up the whole. For MGen Vance, the needs of the many trumped the needs of the few, however important those few might be.

But the problems did not simply go away with Vance’s retirement and Hewson’s posting. In June 1989 CIS MGen Pattee wrote to Vance’s successor, then LGen John de Chastelain,

noting that Vance had asked the CIS to be patient and let the force development process evolve to a solution. “We have been patient,” Pattee wrote, “but the problems of a year ago have not disappeared, but have been exacerbated.”⁷⁶ The ISX project needed more people, but CIS could not get them, because of the “arbitrary” ceilings; new positions would have to be found within the existing establishments. Looking at the future implications, he wrote that the “essential question” was, “whether DND can stay in the intelligence business if we are unable to accept automated information from our allies.”⁷⁷ He attached an appendix that laid out the personnel shortfalls: nearly 500 person-positions, most of which were associated with the ISX project. While Pattee’s plea did not fall on entirely deaf ears, neither was he to get any relief. A penciled marginal note by the VCDS stuck to the same DND policy line as Vance had done: “This problem must be considered in the overall context of NDHQ ceilings/reduction.”⁷⁸

Two weeks after Pattee’s memo, LCol Ray J. Taylor submitted a report, requested by the DGINT, on how the CIS Branch could implement the ISX project using existing CIS personnel. The study focused on meeting the needs for only the first of three ISX phases: the Foundation Group of Systems (FGS), which itself would be introduced in two stages – by August 1990, and January 1996. Treasury Board had approved only the first stage, but the report reviewed the needs of the FGS through the completion of stage two. Taylor analyzed the duties and staffing of all DGINT directorates, carefully trying to identify absolutely vital functions and those where some reductions could be made. This was not an easy task; there really were no superfluous tasks or people. Every reduction entailed some loss of capability. Within CIS as a whole DGINT would sustain 60% of the cuts, the remainder coming from the Security and Support sections: for a total of 46 positions. It would be a huge loss, but would allow the ISX project to proceed.⁷⁹

Not surprisingly, Taylor's report was not well received within DGINT. LCol Gordon S. Graham, head of the Directorate of Imagery Exploitation, remarked at the opening of his lengthy critique that,

“it seems counter-productive to continue to increase DISA at the expense of the production directorates. If we continue to do this ... we will end up with more computer support staff than analysts to work the available terminals ... the classic situation of the tail wagging the dog.”⁸⁰

Graham went on to assert that every iteration of the proposed changes already had been tried and had failed. He then critically dissected some of the reductions and changes in Taylor's memo, giving particular attention to his own directorate. He pointed out that DIE exploited only three per cent of the imagery it received, so any reduction threatened an already weak function, and could prompt the US to send less – a net loss for Canada.⁸¹

In his 21 June memo, LCol Taylor had acknowledged that, owing to the most recent budget cuts, the goals of the force development plan, indeed of the 1987 White Paper itself, could no longer be achieved.⁸² In retrospect, it could appear that trying to enforce artificial personnel ceilings and cuts for a plan that was no longer workable did not make sense. But fiscal constraints and the need to create computing capacity overrode outdated personnel planning logic. The ISX FGS had to go ahead to ensure that the CIS branch could do its job, even if only on a reduced scale. In any case, within a few months, the Berlin Wall came down, and the strategic calculus that had driven Canadian DI for four decades all but vanished overnight.

If DI personnel were worried that they would have nothing to do, they need not have been. The CF were more operationally active in the 1990s than they had been since the 1950s. The decade opened with a major internal security operation in Quebec (the Oka Crisis, 1990), quickly followed by the Gulf Crisis and War (1990-91). From 1992 on, peacekeeping/peace

support operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and elsewhere consumed thousands of CF personnel. The decade ended with CF aircraft in combat over Serbia, and troops deploying into Kosovo. These operations made demands on DI that were handled by temporary crisis cells.⁸³ Fitzgerald and Hennessy assert that intelligence coordination “posed a challenge for NDHQ.”⁸⁴ But discussing those in any detail would extend this paper beyond manageable lengths. For the purpose of this study, two points are worth making: first, it is clear that DI did not at that time see support to deployed forces as its primary function, but rather as secondary, even distracting;⁸⁵ and second, this was due to the fact that while it was performing that task, its leadership still had to wrestle with more reviews, budget cuts, staffing issues, and the challenge of computerization.

The ‘Functional Review’ of 1990 was, like those that preceded it, focused on finding economies of scale and cost, all in the name of efficiency. And, as usual, this meant finding ways to do more with fewer people. On 5 November the CIS (now RAdm John Slade) issued a briefing paper for the review. The paper first identified the staffing shortfall: the CIS branch was 16 positions below its establishment. It then pointed out that the CIS manning levels were insufficient to maintain the 24/7 watch brief required by the two operations, while simultaneously carrying out the normal branch activities. Moreover, priority in new staffing had been given to the ISX project, leaving other divisions within CIS short-staffed. Any further reductions contemplated by the review would leave CIS unable to fulfil some important tasks.⁸⁶

The Gulf War did not stop the Functional Review, but the proposed reductions in CIS were postponed until after OP FRICTION (the Canadian deployment) ended.⁸⁷ That said, even as the war continued the CIS asked his branch to plan for the post-war period and implementation of the Review. They were told to identify the significant activities they could accomplish with the [reduced] staffing assigned to them, and to create a short list of important activities they felt should be included, but which could not be fulfilled due to staffing constraints. The CIS had his

own priorities he regarded as mandatory: procuring and staffing of ISX FGS phase one; a minimum drug intelligence capability; and creation of an operational intelligence tasking cell.⁸⁸ RAdm Slade reiterated the capability losses that the Functional Review necessitated. And, while he made some personnel reductions in the CIS branch overall, he resisted pressure to cut staff in DG INT, largely to ensure that the ISX project first phase could be implemented.⁸⁹

The ink was barely dry on the Functional Review in 1991 when the CDS and DM ordered a review specifically focused on DI. LGen (ret.) D.M. McNaughton did the study under the direction of the VCDS. It was to be completed by 14 Dec 1991, with final report delivered 31 Jan 1992.⁹⁰ The McNaughton report made 18 recommendations, including further reorganization of the DG INT branch. On the ISX project it recommended that it continue but be ended upon completion of the first phase. Instead of creating a bespoke system, a team would examine the option of purchasing “off-the-shelf” systems, even though this would constrain future hardware and software solutions and would require a new procurement strategy.⁹¹

This seemed to be a reasonable and manageable plan of action, but a year later very little progress had been made. The amalgamation of the VCDS/DCDS branches during the summer of 1992 had delayed progress, as did the need to consult with the heads of all affected groups. So, almost everything was still under consideration.⁹² Thus, it should come as no surprise that in the 1996/97-1997/98 draft business plan for DG INT, BGen Ken Hague had to acknowledge that “The implementation of Information Technology (IT) within the Division since 1990 has been modest and evolutionary.”⁹³

Re-engineering Defence Intelligence 1995-99

The Liberals came back to power in 1993 and initiated yet another review of defence policy. In fact, this marked an era of multiple reviews of Canadian military affairs, and defence budget cuts, often referred to collectively as the “Decade of Darkness”.⁹⁴ Prime Minister

Chretien set the tone immediately upon taking office, when he cancelled the controversial contract for new, long-overdue shipborne helicopters.⁹⁵ This was a harbinger of things to come.

In the *1994 Defence White Paper* MND David Collenette made it clear that the CF and DND were going to experience serious reductions. This was due largely to the government's financial situation: its commitment to maintain social programs while trying to reduce deficits and the growing burden of accumulated debt. The white paper predicted that by Fiscal Year 2000, defence spending would be only about 60% of the level anticipated in the 1987 white paper.⁹⁶ It acknowledged that DND and the CF had "already made a large contribution to the national effort to reduce the deficit, [but] the Government believes that additional cuts are both necessary and possible." The paper added that, "As a consequence of the further decline in defence expenditure that forms the fiscal context of this paper, cuts will be deeper, and there will be more reductions, cancellations, and delay."⁹⁷

The changes imposed via the white paper and the 1994 and 1995 budgets – forced DND and the CF to examine ways to preserve operational capability. One of initiatives to achieve this was "re-engineering", described by one analyst as,

"the radical redesign of an organization's processes, intended to result in dramatic improvements to delivered products and/or services. The specific CF embodiment of this ... was the Management Command and Control Re-engineering Team (MCCRT)."⁹⁸

Although its origins can be traced to the early 1990s, the MCCRT was launched officially in January 1995. It had a mandate to re-design the DND/CF structures for command and control and for resource management. It focused primarily on restructuring and reducing the sizes of NDHQ, command, and operational headquarters. The key features of this process included:

- Reducing resources for headquarters functions by one-third (later extended to 50%);

- Relocating the Chiefs of Environmental Staffs (sea, land, and air) from Halifax, Montreal, and Winnipeg respectively to NDHQ, where they would continue to act as service commanders but also act as the strategic staff of the CDS and the DM;
- Eliminating service (i.e. Command) headquarters.⁹⁹ The new NDHQ looked remarkably like CFHQ before Hellyer's reorganisation.¹⁰⁰ In thirty years it had come full circle.

Driven as much by business management practices and fads as by government priorities, the bottom line of re-engineering was about limiting spending and maximizing fewer resources. It meant "doing more with less."¹⁰¹ Yet, reduced spending and fewer personnel were not the results of re-engineering, but pre-determined parameters within which the change process had to work. Not surprisingly, the MCCRT exercise had its skeptics,¹⁰² and not without some justification. It proved impossible to apply re-engineering processes exactly to DND for reasons unique to the department's responsibilities within government. Nor were the processes applied across the department as a whole. They also encountered resistance and inertia, so some parts of DND never were re-engineered. The result was that instead of creating a whole new management structure, the old one was largely retained with only some internal tinkering and fewer personnel. By 1999, the department could not provide an agreed "view of the impact or effectiveness of its reorganization." And as late as 2004 there was "little evidence that any component of the MCCRT was even measured."¹⁰³ It was a damning indictment.

Notice of planned reductions was given in March 1994, even before the MCCRT process began. DG INT was to lose ten positions. DDI was pared down to three sections: current intelligence; global issues and Eurasia; and rest of the world. DIE would lose 15 military positions, even while it was taking on new responsibilities for imagery production under an agreement with the US. This required a reorganization of DIE. Consequently, some capabilities, such as imagery support to NATO, would be lost or reduced. But, in spite of the cuts, DG INT

had to accommodate the intelligence requirements of the “real world” outside DND. Within the current intelligence section DDI created a “Yugoslavia Crisis Cell” with a team of seven watch officers and NCOs.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, the officer responsible for DG INT coordination at this time (DICPD) raised concerns about the reorganization within the J2 staff. Prior to the arrival of the new DCDS (VAdm Mason) the SO/DG INT had drafted a memo pointing out that since 1990 the DCDS Group had assumed responsibility for J2 and J3, with the DCDS being recognized as both. (This was made explicit with the title of DCDS ISO). He argued that it made more sense for the DCDS to retain the J3 (Ops) role, while delegating J2 to the DG INT. The DICPD noted that while such a change would reflect how things actually were working, he cautioned against formalizing that change immediately. He warned that the US and the UK felt Canada *seemed* not to be “pulling our weight within CANUKUS”. He suggested further that downgrading the J2 from a 3-star to 1-star officer could send the message to Canada’s allies that it no longer saw military intelligence as important. Pointing to the DCDS (a 3-star) as J2 in name could alleviate this, but in fact the DCDS was wearing the J3 ‘hat’, ensuring the primacy of Operations, and in the process possibly downgrading the status of the actual J2 – the DG INT.¹⁰⁵

By mid-1995 DG INT was facing further reorganization under the MCCRT, this time to bring its structure more in line with that of J3 (Ops). This plan divided it into three branches: J2 Ops, J2 Plans/Policy, and J2 Geomatics. J2 Ops was responsible for intelligence production, and would comprise existing DDI, DSTI, NDIC (current intelligence), and DIE. J2 Plans/Policy would receive additional personnel to meet an expanded range of tasks that included, among others: plans, doctrine, policy, requirements, international liaison, automation, coordination, dissemination, exercises, and publications. Ops and Plans/Policy would, under this plan, each retain a full colonel as its head to provide breadth and depth of experience as well as to represent

DG INT at the appropriate levels in inter-governmental and international forums. The DCDS strongly endorsed the structural changes and the position ranks.¹⁰⁶

J2/DG INT Commodore Ted Heath and his successor BGen Ken Hague believed they had strong cases for retaining existing DI capabilities, if not for strengthening them. However, according to Cox, who interviewed members of the team, the MCCRT disagreed; it felt that they had failed to demonstrate “operational value added”, and that J2/DG INT just did not “get it”.¹⁰⁷ By that, it is clear they meant that DI did not grasp that the MCCRT exercise was not about getting more resources or protecting what they had; it was all about doing more with less. In particular, one goal was to reduce the number of high-ranking (and costly) officers at the rank of colonel working in DI.¹⁰⁸ So, it was to be cut yet again.

By the end of July 1995, a new, even leaner J2/DG INT structure had been approved: J2 Ops as defined above; J2 Plans (but not Policy), with the tasks noted above; and J2 Geomatics, which would have Ops, Engineering, and the Mapping and Charting Establishment. It would be effective 1 September 1995, after the annual posting season.¹⁰⁹ While this change was going on, the NDIC was revising the Yugoslavia Crisis cell to better meet DND/CF needs.¹¹⁰ But this was just the interim organization. Phase two would see the structure revised yet again: J2 Plans would regain a policy function. J2 Ops would include: current intelligence (NDIC); strategic and regional assessments; scientific and technical intelligence; and imagery. J2 Geomatics would be unchanged. Not long after, however, the National Special Centre was transferred from STI to J2 Coordination. And for reasons of bureaucratic tidiness this entailed changes in nomenclature.¹¹¹

By late 1996, the effects of the MCCRT process were readily apparent. Like the rest of DND, J2 was required to produce ‘business plans’, which included ‘mission statements’ and detailed fiscal accounting procedures, covering everything from salaries to expenditures on pens and paper. But this apart, MCCRT had achieved little within J2 except some internal

restructuring in pursuit of minor efficiencies, but resulting largely in retaining the 'status quo'.¹¹² Indeed, an internal MCCRT document indicates that after about 18 months of work the process had fallen short. It observed that the DG INT branch had "already undergone reorganization as a result of earlier initiatives, resulting in an increased focus on support to operations."¹¹³ That this might cast into doubt the need for re-engineering the J2/DG Int branch was not acknowledged. Instead, it identified issues yet to be resolved: staffing levels (with a view to further reductions); creation of a line strategic intelligence unit (another matter raised before the MCCRT process began); amalgamation of DIE and the CF Photographic Unit; how to integrate 22 personnel offered by Land Force Command to staff crisis cells (which would complicate efforts to reach lower staffing levels); where to locate a National Intelligence Centre (NIC); and the need for more explanation of the concept of 'virtual teams'.¹¹⁴ In March 1997 the J2 (BGen Ken Hague) identified thirteen positions to be eliminated through 1997-98, while explaining the implications of the losses. He also pointed out that the proposed staff reductions would be negated if DND approved the strategic intelligence unit, resulting in no personnel or cost savings at all.¹¹⁵

By May 1997 J2 STI was claiming that it was in crisis. Three years earlier it had established an S&T HUMINT program, using CF sources and access to allied HUMINT to generate Canadian analysis. That, in turn, leveraged access to UK HUMINT, so much, in fact, that STI had a backlog. But budget constraints on both conference and non-conference travel (e.g., to arms shows) were limiting STI's ability to access it and material from the DIA.¹¹⁶ In a January 1998 briefing to the DCDS, the J2 made a strong case that the J2 DG INT division had been pared down to the bare minimum, to the extent that certain functions (e.g. the 24/7 watch) were under-staffed and had no depth or built-in redundancy.¹¹⁷ Yet, further cuts were forthcoming. J2 Ops was to lose five military and one civilian positions for FY 1999-2000.¹¹⁸ In a notable change, DI focus had shifted significantly. The 1999 draft *Defence Intelligence Priorities*

document ranked “current/warning intelligence and support to deployed forces” first among its three priorities, with DI support to strategic level decision-making and support to allies shown as second and third, respectively.¹¹⁹

What is striking about this phase of DI reorganization is that the documents are replete with the jargon and buzzwords of the world of commerce: “re-engineering”; “business plans”; “vision”; “corporate”; “performance indicators”; “service to clients”, just to name a few. This would have been unimaginable even in the immediate aftermath of Unification. They are, in my view, symbolic or symptomatic of the extent to which civilian bureaucratic thinking and practices had come to permeate defence planning by the 1990s. While this was an incremental process over several decades, it became much more noticeable after 1993. The tone was set from the top. Determined to get the debt and deficit spending under control, the civilian leadership – from the PM and Minister of Finance through the DND bureaucracy – had adopted a business model to run DND and the CF. Whether that was an appropriate approach is very much open to question. Certainly, the uncertain, indeed unmeasured, impact of the re-engineering program on the CF and the department as a whole cast that experiment into some doubt.

With regard to defence intelligence the most notable effect was loss of capability. On the eve of deployment to Afghanistan the J2/DG INT staff comprised some 500 military and civilians, a slight majority of whom served outside NDHQ in other headquarters and formations or in liaison positions abroad. The CF’s DI personnel had earned an enviable reputation for their “quality, training, adaptability, and experience,” but there was concern about the fact that junior MI officers received no training beyond the basic IO course. After all of the reviews and reorganizations senior leaders in the CF and DND were so concerned about the quality of the intelligence effort that they commissioned the Chief of Review Services to conduct another review in 2002, which was followed by the more comprehensive *Defence Intelligence Review*,

completed in 2004.¹²⁰ Some of these concerns found their way into the media. Quoting an internal DND document, the *Ottawa Citizen* reported in June 2001 that the CF's military intelligence collection capabilities had been seriously degraded in recent years. Staffing had declined "to the point where the associated risk is barely acceptable", yielding "unreliable and uncorroborated intelligence products" that could leave commanders and their political masters poorly informed.¹²¹ Furthermore, although many countries were using UAVs for reconnaissance, Canada had not yet decided to fulfil its stated UAV requirement.¹²² That and other needs would be met once Canada became involved in the Afghan war. The CF's intelligence structures, designed for high intensity conflict, would be adapted to the low-intensity stabilization and counter-insurgency campaigns to which the CF were committed. Canadian DI proved very effective at the tactical/operational levels, but its grasp of the insurgency at the strategic level was weak, although it improved over time.¹²³

Conclusions

This paper identified and examined six phases of defence intelligence reorganization between 1965 and 2000. The reasons for those changes and the effects they had varied considerably. That said, before drawing firm conclusions about these, a word of caution is in order. The documents cited probably represent only a small portion of the paperwork generated in each case. There are gaps in the record, so any conclusions should be regarded as tentative.

The Unification phase was efficiency- and cost-driven. The new 'unified' armed forces were intended to be more efficient, but also less costly. The effects on defence intelligence were centralization of DI functions, some loss of personnel, but more capability and a higher profile among its users at the senior military and political levels. Considering the myriad of problems that arose during (and largely due to) the Unification/Integration process, the relatively smooth transformation of DI at that time could be considered a success, due largely to BGen Kenyon.

The transfer of SIGINT to DND was driven by administrative problems and unwanted publicity. The earlier transfer of the intercept stations to DG INT meant that the responsibility for SIGINT operations was divided between NRC, DND, and the IPC (which barely functioned). The NRC was no longer comfortable with a function for which it was responsible, but which it did not control. For its part, DND was paying the lion's share of the costs. Consolidation of the SIGINT capability within DND resulted in administrative tidiness, particularly for accounting. There was no direct gain for DI simply from a change of administrative control. But because DI was the primary consumer of CSE's SIGINT products, and those also yielded intelligence-sharing benefits with Canada's allies, *continuing* that capability was a benefit to DI.

By contrast, the rationale for the structure & direction changes undertaken between 1976 and 1984 was not clear – at least in the documents I used. From those I was able to discern two effects: changes in internal taskings and in external reporting chains. But sources offered no evidence to suggest that these resulted in better performance or improved analytic products.

The effort to coordinate intelligence production carried out from 1984 to 1988 at least had the benefit of a clear, indeed logical, intention: to centralize control of that production in order to ensure quality control, timeliness, relevance, and efficient delivery of intelligence. But it was launched without a clear plan – at least in the documents I have seen – or with enough staff. The result was organizational confusion, frequent re-shuffling of the coordinating unit, and ultimately a failure to fulfil the intent. There was no evidence of better coordination.

The challenge of adapting to automated data processing (ADP) between 1984 and 1996 was driven by two closely related factors: first, an increasing volume of data exceeded the ability of DI analysts to work on it manually, and second, they needed to keep pace with Canada's allies, who were moving rapidly toward digital data handling. But DG INT's commitment to the manpower-intensive bespoke ISX project during a time of personnel and cost constraints forced

it to pursue ADP at the expense of analytic capability, a classic example of the ‘tail wagging the dog’. The end result was the worst of both worlds: by 1996 DG INT has lost analytic staff, but its computer needs had not been met. In fact, the McNaughton review of DG INT’s requirements recommended that ISX be abandoned in favour of purchasing an off-the-shelf system. Sources available to me do not show whether that had been done by the end of the period under study. In retrospect, it is tempting to say that DG INT should have considered the off-the-shelf option much sooner. It might have been cheaper, but they had to consider sunk costs invested in ISX. Nor could it make those decisions in isolation; it had to take into account ADP plans within DND as a whole, since at some level the systems would have to be compatible. Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the ‘explosion’ of personal computing systems and the rapid growth of the Internet in the 1990s would not have made choosing an ‘ideal’ system much easier. Systems were changing rapidly, and DG INT still would have needed to develop overall architecture to link all the relevant parts, which would have had personnel and manpower costs.

The re-engineering process (1995-99) was solely cost-driven. The *1994 Defence White Paper* had made it clear that reducing the government’s debt & deficits took priority over all other programs. This meant budget reductions, and DND and the CF would not be spared. The intent was to force departments to “do more with less”. But there was no ‘plan’ except to cut. Given that, it is difficult to assess the impact of re-engineering within DND/CF as a whole, or specifically within J2/DG INT which, as indicated above, already had undergone numerous reviews and reorganizations. So, re-engineering generated a lot of meetings and memos, but yielded only minor internal restructuring, and no obvious gains in DI productivity or quality.

What stands out among four of these cases is the systemic failures: poor definition of the problem, the absence of clearly defined goals, poor planning, and often prolonged and ineffective execution of the tasks. This is all the more remarkable when one remembers that it occurred in

two linked organizations (DND and the CF) whose very *raison d'être* was 'planning' for life and death decision-making. How can we explain this? It can be attributed in part to fiscal constraints, but that does not explain the problem in full. It is often tempting to fault individuals. But the evidence – as incomplete as it is – shows that DI leaders at all levels were struggling to preserve essential capabilities even as they tried to make flawed reorganizations work. Rather, as Douglas Bland's studies of CF leadership and defence administration suggest, the problem lay within DND and the CF. Guided by civilian management concepts that took hold in the 1970s,¹²⁴ they subjected themselves to frequent reviews and reorganizations, in pursuit of an elusive ideal functionality that would meld effective civilian administration, accountability, and political control with effective military command and operational capabilities at an acceptable cost. While hardly a futile quest, it yielded less than optimal results. But since Bland himself barely mentions the DI function, with the evidence at hand one can only infer a cause and effect link between those efforts and the flawed attempts to reorganize DI to fulfil its mission: to provide high-quality strategic intelligence for top military and civilian leaders and to support deployed forces. So in spite of the many reorganization efforts over thirty-five years, on the eve of the war in Afghanistan Canadian defence intelligence was under-staffed, under-funded, under-equipped, and not ready for war.

Unless otherwise indicated, the original source documents cited below are from the *Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project Dropbox*. The finding indicators (e.g. DND Int Doc 83-04-17, in Selected Documents, abbrev. SD) are those used in the dropbox and are not the original accession numbers used by Library and Archives Canada. Those can be seen on the documents when they are displayed in PDF form.

¹ O'Neill, *History of the CBNRC*, vol 1, chapter 1, pp. 5-8; Wark, *History of the Post-war Intelligence Community*, chapter 1, p. 2; Milner, *Canada's Navy*, 92, 102, 122; Sarty, *War in the St. Lawrence*, pp. 238-39. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, pp. 434-35, 755-56. See also Dowell, p. 8.

² See Wark, chapter 1, pp. 4-21.

³ O'Neill, *History of the CBNRC*, vol 1, chapter 1, pp. 1-2, chapter 2, p. 2; O'Neill and Hughes, *History of the CBNRC*, vol 7, Chronological Summary; Wark, chapter 2.

⁴ O'Neill, *History of the CBNRC*, Vol. 2, chapter 2, pp. 5, 12, and Annex G, chapter 4, pp. 2, 6-8, 17, 20, vol. 3, chapter 11, pp. 9-12, 29-36 [pages in between redacted]; Aid, *The Secret Sentry*, pp. 11-13; Bamford, *Body of Secrets*, 394-97. The terms of the CANUSA agreement are spelled out in correspondence between Mr. G.G. Crean, Chairman, Communications Research Committee, Ottawa, and MGen C.P. Cabell, Chairman, US Communications

Intelligence Board, 27 May 1949 and 29 June 1949, found in CSE ATIP-released file A-2016-00131, posted in ATI Other Releases, on CFIHP dropbox.

⁵ Quoted in Bland, p. 15.

⁶ Wark, *History of the Post-war Intelligence Community*, chapter 1, p. 3; see also, ch. 6

⁷ Alan Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups", 31 October 2018, a brief based on archival sources, interviews, DND phone books, and other sources, from 1946 to 2016. Posted on CFIHP dropbox. Kenyon interview, UVic oral history program (notes by Barnes from interview tapes – note reel #s).

⁸ Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups"; DND Int Docs 65-06 to 65-10 discuss the creation of DSTI. The DRB also administered the Joint Intelligence Board, which did economic intelligence.

⁹ Bland, p. 125.

¹⁰ Hellyer, "Address," 1966, pp. 14-16. But as Bland points out in *Chiefs of Defence*, pp. 71-76, the actual role and responsibilities of the CDS position were never clarified before it was created, and remained elusive thereafter.

¹¹ White Paper 1964, pp. 17, 21-22.

¹² Mobile Command, including the NATO brigade, remained 'armour-heavy', with limited tactical airlift. Maritime Command did not possess ships that could support any significant amphibious combined arms operations.

¹³ Skaarup, vol. 1, p. 307; Kenyon interview.

¹⁴ Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups" has the DGIS in place by October 1967; Skaarup, p. 383-84. Kenyon thought that Security should be under Intelligence, but the merger effectively reversed that relationship. Kenyon, interview. The DCIS position came into effect in 1969.

¹⁵ Bland, p. 109 Fig. 10, p. 114 Fig. 11.

¹⁶ Memorandum by ACDS, ACDS Staff Organization, 1 Aug 1964, in CDS Doc 64-08-01 - Director General Intelligence TORs, Selected Documents, CFIHP dropbox.

¹⁷ Kenyon interview.

¹⁸ Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, pp. 118-19, citing his diary entry for 30 December 1964.

¹⁹ Kenyon interview.

²⁰ Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups".

²¹ Kenyon interview; Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups".

²² Kenyon interview; letters, Chairman, DRB to CDS, re: "Integration of Scientific Intelligence," 2 September 1965, Eon to DC/DRB, re: "Integration of DSI with DGI", 24 Sept 1965, Memorandum by Eon, 19 Oct 1965, in DND Int Docs 65-06 - 65-10, ATI Archival releases in CFIHP dropbox; letter, ACM Miller CDS to Chairman, DRB, re: "Integration of Scientific Intelligence," and Annex A, 4 Aug 1965, 'Excerpt from minutes of 220th meeting of the Defence Research Management Committee,' 9 Sept 1965, in DND Int Docs 65-08 - 74-03 – DSTI, CFIHP dropbox.

²³ Hellyer, pp. 155-56.

²⁴ Kenyon, interview.

²⁵ Ibid; DND Int Doc 70-07-15 "SIGINT Box - Factual Statement on the Decision Making Points and Processes Within Canadian Intelligence Community," DND Input to Isbister Report, in Selected Documents, CFIHP dropbox. Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups" doesn't show the Supplementary Radio Service within DCIS until 1972. This change presaged the wholesale transfer of SIGINT operations to DND in the mid-1970s. But the SRS personnel were eventually reassigned to Communications Command.

²⁶ Kenyon, interview; "Special Centre Box - Factual Statement ... DND Input to Isbister Report.

²⁷ "Special Centre Box - Factual Statement ... DND Input to Isbister Report.

²⁸ Kenyon, interview.

²⁹ Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups", entry for October 1967.

³⁰ "The Canadian Intelligence Programme," Annex to CJIC 8-96 (69) Final, 13 Nov 1969, paras 6-7, 13-14, 35, 37-38, 46-50, 57, in DEA Int Docs 69-11 - 73-06 - Canadian Intelligence Program (1969-73), ATI Archival Releases, CFIHP Dropbox. The CJIC work programme for 1969-70 included five papers on Soviet military capabilities and intentions, the largest number focused on any one country.

³¹ PCO Report 70-11-09, C. M. Isbister, *Intelligence Operations in the Canadian Government* [hereafter cited as *Isbister Report*] 9 Nov. 1970, pp. 31, 34-36, 52, Selected Documents, CFIHP dropbox.

³² Letter, R. J. Robson, British Liaison Officer, to Acting Director, CBNRC, 7 June 1971, re: "Recent Comments by Director GCHQ," IPC Docs 70-11 - 72-01 - Isbister Review, in ATI Archival Releases.

³³ *The Fifth Estate: The Espionage Establishment*, CBC Television, 9 Jan. 1974, transcript, accessed 7 Jan 2018, at: <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B0wdLKxvw1xsam9FSU9XcXRPSWs/edit>

³⁴ CCSI Docs 66-06 to 80-04, Minutes, Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 15 Jan. 1975, and O'Neill, *History of the CBNRC*, vol. 1, ch. 2, p. 27, both in ATI Archival Releases, CFIHP dropbox.

³⁵ O'Neill, *History of the CBNRC*, vol. 1, ch. 2, pp. 28, 31.

³⁶ O'Neill, *History of the CBNRC*, vol. 1, ch. 2, Annex G, *Intelligence Advisory Committee SIGINT Memorandum # 1 Control of Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) in Canada*, 24 Aug 1977.

- ³⁷ O'Neill, *History of the CBNRC*, vol. 1, ch. 3, Annex L: CSE org chart for 1975 shows that three of its five SIGINT production groups were dedicated solely to military intelligence subjects.
- ³⁸ Middlemiss and Sokolsky, pp. 32, 35-42; Byers, p. 10.
- ³⁹ DND Int Doc 75-06-02 - Proposed DINTP Reorganization, 2 June 1975, Selected Documents, CFIHP dropbox.
- ⁴⁰ Bland, *Administration*, pp. 103, 111.
- ⁴¹ Bland, *Administration*, pp. 112-15; Cox, *Transformation*, p. 23.
- ⁴² Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups", entry for summer/autumn 1976; DND Int Doc 76-05-19 - DDI Organization Chart, 19 May 1976, Selected Documents, CFIHP dropbox.
- ⁴³ Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups", entry for summer/autumn 1976.
- ⁴⁴ DND Int Doc 80-12-23 - DSTI Reorganization, in Selected Documents, CFIHP dropbox; Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups", entry for Spring 1982. The DND chart in the IAC document of 30 December 1980 was incorrectly dated (the intent probably was that the changes would be in force in January 1981), but there was no change in the DND phonebook until 1982.
- ⁴⁵ DND Int Doc 83-02-03 CIS TORs, 3 Feb. 1983, p. 1, in selected documents, CFIHP Dropbox.
- ⁴⁶ DND Int Doc 83-02-03 CIS TORs, 3 Feb. 1983, pp. 2-5, in selected documents, CFIHP Dropbox. "Technical control" of the SRS stations referred to "control exercised by virtue of professional or technical jurisdiction". It may bypass command channels, but is restricted to certain specialized areas, mostly to procedures and machines.
- ⁴⁷ DND Int Doc 83-02-03 CIS TORs, 3 Feb. 1983, pp. 6-7.
- ⁴⁸ DND Int Doc 84-10-31 - DG Int TOR [draft], 31 Oct. 1984, pp. 1-2, in selected documents, CFIHP dropbox.
- ⁴⁹ DND Int Doc 84-10-31 - DG Int TOR [draft], 31 Oct. 1984, pp. 2-3.
- ⁵⁰ Skaarup, vol 2, p. 463.
- ⁵¹ Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups", entry for Spring 1987; DND Int Doc 86-11-86-12 DGINT Organization, in selected documents
- ⁵² *PPC Structure Review*, Jan. 1986, p. 1, DND Int Doc 86-01 DGINT Production Planning Coordination, in selected documents
- ⁵³ *PPC Structure Review*, Jan. 1986, p. 1.
- ⁵⁴ *PPC Structure Review*, Jan. 1986, p. 2.
- ⁵⁵ *PPC Structure Review*, Jan. 1986, p. 5.
- ⁵⁶ *PPC Structure Review*, Jan. 1986, pp. 5-6.
- ⁵⁷ *PPC Structure Review*, Jan. 1986, pp. 11-13.
- ⁵⁸ Cmdre J.C. Slade, memo, *DGINT Organization*, 3 Dec. 1986, DND Int Doc 86-12-03 - New DG Int Organization; and *CIS Organization Chart*, DND Int Doc 87-02-23, in selected documents.
- ⁵⁹ Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups", entry for Autumn 1987. See also: DGINT org chart as of 1 Nov 1987, *CIS Organization*, DND Int Doc 88-01-19, in selected documents.
- ⁶⁰ Maj. K.F. Binda (DIPD5), *Memo – DIPD5 Mandate*, 24 Aug. 1988, DND Int Doc 88-08-24, selected documents
- ⁶¹ Cmdre J. Rodocanachi (DGIS), Memorandum, *Automatic Data Processing in DGIS*, 13 March 1980, IAC Document, 80-03-13, in Selected Documents
- ⁶² DND telephone directory, Autumn 1983, p. E-43; Barnes, "Defence Intelligence Assessment Groups", entry for Autumn 1984
- ⁶³ Gaétan Lavertu, DG Foreign Intelligence Bureau, External Affairs, Note on DND ISX project for ICSI meeting, 19 Feb. 1987. DEA Int Doc 87-02-19, in selected documents
- ⁶⁴ DEA Int Doc 87-02-19 – Note on DND ISX project.
- ⁶⁵ *Challenge and Commitment*, pp. 49-64; Middlemiss and Sokolsky, pp. 51-53; Dangerfield, "The 1st Canadian Division," *CDQ* (1990), p. 8.
- ⁶⁶ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, p. 268.
- ⁶⁷ Memo, MGEN C.W. Hewson (CIS) to VCDS, 25 Mar. 1988, DND Int Doc 88-03-25, in selected documents
- ⁶⁸ Memo, MGEN C.W. Hewson (CIS) to VCDS, 25 Mar. 1988, DND Int Doc 88-03-25, in selected documents
- ⁶⁹ Memo, MGEN C.W. Hewson (CIS) to VCDS, 25 Mar. 1988, DND Int Doc 88-03-25, in selected documents
- ⁷⁰ Memo, Hewson, *Canadian Forces Total Force Development Plan*, 28 Mar 1988, DND Int Doc 88-03-28, S. D.
- ⁷¹ Addendum to Hewson memo, 28 Mar 1988, p. 6.
- ⁷² Addendum to Hewson memo, 28 Mar 1988, p. 7.
- ⁷³ Addendum to Hewson memo, 28 Mar 1988, p. 7.
- ⁷⁴ Memo, Vance (VCDS) to Hewson (CIS), 8 Apr 1988, DND Int Doc 88-03-28, S. D.
- ⁷⁵ Skaarup, vol. 2, p. 464.
- ⁷⁶ Memo, Pattee (CIS) to de Chastelain (VCDS), *Defence Planning and Force Development Process – CIS Branch*, 7 June 1989, DND Int Doc 89-06-07, in selected documents
- ⁷⁷ Memo, Pattee (CIS) to de Chastelain (VCDS), 7 June 1989.
- ⁷⁸ Memo, Pattee (CIS) to de Chastelain (VCDS), 7 June 1989, VCDS marginal comment (undated).

- ⁷⁹ LCol R. J. Taylor, *Memorandum Draft FGS Personnel Requirements, and Service Paper*, 21 Jun 1989, DND Int Doc 89-06-21
- ⁸⁰ LCol, G.S. Graham (DIE), *Memorandum: Manpower Reductions*, 26 Jun 1989, DND Int Doc 89-06-26, in S. D.
- ⁸¹ Graham, *Memorandum: Manpower Reductions*
- ⁸² Taylor, *Memorandum Draft FGS Personnel Requirements, and Service Paper*
- ⁸³ Memorandum, by J2 (RAdm Slade), *NDHQ Joint Intelligence and Security Intelligence Organization – J2 – Persian Gulf Crisis*, 11 Jan 1991, DND Int Doc 91-01-11, in Selected Documents. Later, a Yugoslavia Crisis Cell was set up to support Canadian troops deployed there under UN command.
- ⁸⁴ Fitzgerald and Hennessy, “An Expedient Reorganization: the NDHQ J-Staff System in the Gulf War,” *CMJ* (Spring 2003), p. 27.
- ⁸⁵ Later documents indicate that support to deployed forces had become top priority by the end of the decade.
- ⁸⁶ Memorandum CIS (RAdm Slade) to NDHQ Functional Review Coordinator, *NDHQ Functional Review – CIS Briefing Document 2nd Submission*, 5 Nov 1990, DND Int Doc 90-11-05, in Selected Documents
- ⁸⁷ Memorandum, *CIS Function Review Reduction Implementation Plan – Op FRICTION Implications*, by Col P.S. Hargreaves (DGISS), 25 Jan 1991, DND Int Doc 91-01-25, in Selected Documents
- ⁸⁸ Memorandum, by M.P. Bowen (SA/CIS), *Post-War Post-Functional Review Implementation – CIS Branch Structure*, 4 Feb 1991, DND Int Doc 91-02-04, Selected Documents
- ⁸⁹ Memorandum, by VCDS, *CIS Branch Structure Post-Functional Review*, 24 April 1991 (including memorandum and annexes by CIS, 14 March 1991, DND Int Doc 91-04-91-03, Selected Documents
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- Memorandum, BGen B.N. Cameron (DGINT), *Review of DND/CF Intelligence Requirements – Implementation of Final Report*, 30 Aug 1993, DND Int Doc 93-07-93-08, in S.D.
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- ⁹⁴ Gloria Galloway, “Hillier Decries Military’s ‘Decade of Darkness’,” *Globe and Mail*, 16 Feb. 2007, accessed 26 Nov 2018, at: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/hillier-decries-militarys-decade-of-darkness/article20393158/>
- ⁹⁵ Michael Byers and Stewart Webb, “A Government Blunder Teaches us How Not to Buy Helicopters,” *National Post*, 11 Feb. 2013, accessed 10 Jan. 2019, at: <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/michael-byers-and-stewart-webb-a-government-blunder-teaches-us-how-not-to-buy-helicopters>
- ⁹⁶ *1994 Defence White Paper*, pp. 3-7, 9.
- ⁹⁷ *1994 Defence White Paper*, pp. 9-10.
- ⁹⁸ Rostek, “A Framework for Fundamental Change?” *CMJ*, vol 4, no. 5 (2004-5), p. 66, accessed 29 Nov 2018, at: <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo5/no4/manageme-gestion-eng.asp>
- ⁹⁹ Rostek, p. 71, note 5; *1994 Defence White Paper*, p. 41; *Organization and Accountability* (1999), pp. 7, 14.
- ¹⁰⁰ The crucial difference was that the CDS was the overall command authority and the sole military voice to the MND, which the chairman of the pre-1964 Chiefs of Staff Committee never was.
- ¹⁰¹ Rostek, pp. 67-68, quoting the leading thinkers in the field.
- ¹⁰² Cox, *Transformation of Defence Intelligence*, p. 112, citing among others, the Chief of Review Services.
- ¹⁰³ Rostek, pp. 67-68, 71.
- ¹⁰⁴ Memorandum, Cameron (DG INT) to SA (DCDS), *Budget Reductions – Personnel Plan*, 18 Mar 1994, DND Int Doc 94-03-18; Memorandum, by Col Victor Ashdown, *DDI Reorganization*, 6 July 1994, DND Int Doc 94-07-06, both found in Selected Documents
- ¹⁰⁵ Memorandum, Maj. J. W. Nixon (DICPD) to A/DG INT, *J2 Reorganization*, 12 July 1994, DND Int Doc 94-07-12, in SD
- ¹⁰⁶ Memorandum, DCDS (VAdm Mason) to ADM (Per), *DCDS Group ECP 188/94*, 19 June 1995, DND Int Doc 94-12-95-06 in SD.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 112-14
- ¹⁰⁸ Mason to ADM (Per), 19 June 1995. Commodore Heath had originally proposed 5 sections (with DIE and DSTI as separate units reporting to the J2.
- ¹⁰⁹ Memorandum, Cmdre T. C. Heath (J2/DG INT) *DG INT Organization Change*, 27 July 1995, DND Int Doc 95-07-95-08, in SD. Some title changes were marked by hand on the org chart.

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- ¹¹³ *MCCRT Assessment - Overview DCDS organization*, 15 Oct 1996
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁵ BGen K.C. Hague (J2 DG INT) to COS DCDS, *Draft DG INT Reductions*, 17 Mar 1997
- ¹¹⁶ Message, Dr. B.H. Harrison (J2 STI) to J2 Ops, *J2 STI in Crisis Again*, 13 May 1997, DND Int Doc 97-05-13, in S.D.
- ¹¹⁷ *Business Plan Brief to DCDS*, 23 Jan. 1998, DND Int Doc 98-01-23, in S.D.
- ¹¹⁸ K.D. Brigden (J2 Coord), *J2 Division Authorized Strength*, 15 Sept 1998, DND Int Doc 98-09-15, in S.D.
- ¹¹⁹ *1999 Defence Intelligence Priorities [Draft]*, undated [but the file is recorded as 27 Nov 1998], DND Int Doc 98-11-27, in S.D.
- ¹²⁰ Charters, "Canadian Military Intelligence in Afghanistan,"
- ¹²¹ David Pugliese,
- ¹²² Barber article in CMJ
- ¹²³ Charters, "Canadian Military Intelligence in Afghanistan,"
- ¹²⁴ Bland, *Administration*, p 11.